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The value of social work is not only to reinforce preconceived ideals. Sometimes the best social 
work practice may be to contribute to fairer and more effective social institutions. If for instance 
we picture a context in country A of a well ordered social policy and country B were it is not 
working, the chances of effective social work would be higher in country A. Should and could 
the shape of the policy in country A then be exported to country B? This is the paramount 
question I address at two levels in this thesis:  First I look and explore the policy issue: the scope, 
capacity and implementation condition in two different social contexts: Norway and Bolivia 
using the child welfare service as an exemplar policy area. Then I analyze if such policies, using 
Norway as a model, may be transfer from the one context to the other within the interest area of 
policy learning, policy making, policy transfer and political development. I not only found a 
possible way by which political development can be promoted using policy transfer, but this 
research contributes with an innovative scope in transfer research, this is transfer as a tool for 
political development.  
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 1. Introduction 
  
1.1. Background  
 
Human beings are probably one of the most multifaceted organisms inhabiting the earth with an 
outstanding social nature. The dynamism of the human relations had led to a vast variety of social 
institutions, diverse in type, propose, size, composition and complexity. Society’s fundamental 
cells such as the family, church and state had developed at different rates and patterns worldwide, 
providing care and welfare in diverse manners and shared of responsibility. In this context, social 
work takes place in a variety of setting, working and using the human relations as both tool and 
object of interest. When people’s inner social circles are not sufficiently sustaining well-
functioning human relations, social workers professionals are trained to provide guidance. Their 
role in society is to support through interactive processes that enable service users to improve 
their quality of life. As a tool, the nature of the relation between service users and the 
professional has particular characteristics. Social workers act as guides and advocates, using both 
knowledge and a framework of relevant legislation and procedures stablish at a local, national 
and international level.  
 
1.2. Research question statement 
 
In consequence, the support and guidance provided by social workers is dependent on the shape 
of the surrounding social institutions. In fact, social work and like professions are supported and 
legitimated by the state, meaning that their conception of welfare mirrors the priorities and values 
of the community. Their aim is to enable users to achieve the conditions and attainments of an 
ordinary life set by the standards of their own society using their own strengths and terms (Clark, 
2006, pp. 78-79).  However the value of social work is not only to reinforce preconceived ideals. 
Sometimes the best social work practice may be to contribute to fairer and more effective social 
institutions. In this sense advocacy does not only take place at an individual level. Social workers 
can channel the voices of society and promote process of change guided by the experiences and 
knowledge built within the global community and their direct interaction with service users, 
social institution and main street society.  
 
With this in mind, if, for instance, we picture a context in country A of a well ordered social 
policy area where as in country B it is not working, the chances of effective social work would be 
higher in country A. Should and could the shape of the policy in country A then be exported to 
country B? This is the paramount question I address at two levels in this thesis. First I look and 
explore one specific policy area – the policy issue – in two different social contexts, asking how a 
fair and well-functioning policy may look like and identifying a context where there is clear need 
of such policies. Second, I ask whether such policies may be transfer from the one context to the 
other within the interest area of policy learning and policy making – the transferability issue. In 
this introduction I first present these two main questions in more detail, before sketching my 
research design and the structure of the thesis. 
 
1.3. The policy issue: Norway 
 
In an environment of increasing interest and action headed by the European Union in the family 
policy arena, specifically through mechanism such as the soft law, the Open Method of 
Coordination (OMC) and the new millennium; the Scandinavian welfare model and experience  
has been taken as an exceptional prototype  recognized for its effectiveness levels (Lindén, 2007; 
Blum, 2014). With the impetus of cooperation, European countries had faced the learning from 
abroad process as a tool of development. In general terms, the Nordic welfare states often served 
as example when it comes to work–family reconciliation and a more equal share of household 
and waged work between parents, characterized by generous public support systems (ibid). Being 
Norway a country worldwide recognized for its effectiveness in translating policies into practice I 
take it a model from which practices and ideas can be transfered to promote development in 
Bolivia. This is done based on the normative and scope similarities that both countries share in 
relation to the provision covering children under six.  
 
1.4. The policy issue: Bolivia 
 
In Latin America, countries like Bolivia and Venezuela have faced in the last couple decades the 
challenge of reducing income inequality and poverty not only through the allocation of higher 
rates of social expenditure but also by major legislative reforms (Huber and Bogliaccini, 2010). 
For Bolivia the transitional process was rather a radical change were structural glitches were 
unveiled (Peña, 2012).  By the beginning of 2009, a new constitution was ratified by popular 
election, stating a new social pact. The new principles aimed to assured an inclusive citizenship 
for the diversity composing the country, as well as to build avenues for legitimation of the new 
agenda through a new order of participation and representation (s.e. article 26 new Constitution 
in Asamblea Constituyente de Bolivia, 2008). Bolivia’s new vision shared the principles 
established by international tools such as the International Declaration of Human Rights and the 
United National Convention for The Rights of the Child, giving foot to further legislative reforms 
(s.e. New Children’s Code, New Autonomy Framework Law, etc.).  
 
On the international sight of the conditions that Bolivia has in the implementation of the humans 
rights and the rights of the child are controversial. In regards to the Children’s Rights, since 2010 
recommendation had constantly been made in concern to both practices and normative principles 
by international organization (European Network of Ombudsperson for Children, 2010; Child 
Rights International Network, 2010).  By 2015, co-party reviews were positive in relation to the 
increase of the scope of the state’s responsibility over the provision of human’s rights in general. 
However results were different in respects to the scope and the capacity of the state to ensure the 
implementation process. Peer-review countries on one hand, positively characterized Bolivia as 
having an increase in the budget assigned to social development and  major legislative changes in 
line with the United Nation Declaration of the Humans Rights, Rights of the Child, and previous 
recommendations. On the other, international organisms such as the Indian Counsel of South 
America, Human Rights Watch, and Franciscans International, recognized the advanced 
legislation on human rights in Bolivia, but noticed a lack of mechanisms to implement, being 
necessary to strengthen resources and capacities to deal with risks mainly associated to 
indigenous groups, women and children (The United Nations Office at Geneva, 2015).  
 
1.5. Delimitation: The policy issue 
 
Both countries have ratified both, the United Nations Declaration of the Human Rights, and the 
Rights of the Child, both had assumed and endorsed coherent stands on their constitutional and 
legal provisions, still, results remain different. By 2010, The United Nations Human 
Development Report (2014) ranked Norway as the leading country with a score (0.944) nearest to 
the ideal 1 in the Human Development Index. Bolivia showed a far different situation, with a 
0.667 index, ranking on 113th position of 187 countries. Similarly the Income Gini Coefficient 
positioned Norway with the nearest score (25.8) to the ideal 0 of absolute equality, whereas 
Bolivia score 56.3. There are several conditions leading to this difference. In this study I provide 
an analysis of these conditions from the stand point of political development, where emphasis is 
put on the differences on the capacity of both states to translate policies into practice. This 
comprehension serves as the fundament to explore the possibility of using Norway as a model to 
promote development in Bolivia through the means of policy transferability.  
  
In fact, effective social policy regimes should not only work towards lowering the levels of 
poverty and inequality, but also by increasing the levels of human capital (Huber and Bogliaccini, 
2010). In this context, this thesis will explore the policy issue by first addressing the 
characteristics of the policies, services, and institutions that make the Norwegian child welfare 
service efficient and effective in not only reducing and attending risks, but enhancing higher 
levels of human capital. A similar analysis will be conducted for the Bolivian scenario. In this 
case attention will be centered on identifying the features that need to be developed, the 
challenges and the necessities of change within the policies, services and institutional framework 
in accordance with the new framework laws and New Children’s Code assumed by the country in 
2014.     
 
1.6. Delimitation: the transferability issue 
 
The second part of the thesis will focus on addressing the issue of policy transferability. 
Traditionally there had been two contradictory position towards the used of role models in the 
process of policy making. On one hand, some scholars had begun to question the whole idea of 
transferability and remain sceptic over the extent to which experiences from abroad can be used 
to enhance development elsewhere. On the other, a different group supports the idea that policy 
learning is in fact possible as it enhances a process of contribution without the risk of dependent 
learning (Gough and Therborn, 2010; Rothstein, 1998).  
 
In fact, these positions can be traced back to the drive mechanisms on the continuum from 
coercion to voluntary adoption (Blum, 2014). For those against the idea of policy transferability, 
the fear towards coercive processes of policy making is characteristic of the experience of 
dependency and colonization lived by the global south. From this view, the south has been 
historically overpowered by the pressure to comply with the standards and footprints left by the 
developed world, giving foot to a process of ‘dependent learning’(Gough and Therborn, 2010, 
p.710). For this scholars, the promotion of development of welfare states and social policies in 
the South cannot simply be an add-on to the conventional Eurocentric approach. In fact, policies 
can become so institutionalized and historically embedded that is virtually impossible to break 
free as replication of historical steps and conditions is unrealistic (Grenner, 2002).  
 
On the other hand, there is abundant evidence from successful experiences of policy 
transferability and policy learning in both the developed and the developing world. In fact there 
are different degrees to which policies can be transferred, allowing different levels of adjustment 
freedom. Dolowitz and Marsh (2000) distinguish between four different degrees: direct copying, 
emulation, combination, and inspiration. These degrees not only provide sufficient flexibility, but 
they solve the power issue consider by the path-dependency and dependent learning point of 
view.  By going beyond the compulsory requirements, it’s possible to practice a flexible policy 
learning where there is sufficient room for the emergence of autonomous social policy within a 
context of cooperation. The debate over the issue of policy transferability is far from reaching an 
end; and is actually in its climax with the introductions of international mechanism off 
cooperation like the Open Method of Coordination. The second part of this thesis will explore the 
possibility of policy transferability and policy learning from the Norwegian to the Bolivian model 
through an analysis on the area of child-welfare services. The aim is to contribute to a better 
understanding of the process of policy development.   
 
1.7. Methodology 
 
Methodically speaking, this research subscribes within the context of a comparative study of 
qualitative nature, providing an in-depth understanding on the nature of both models in relation to 
the field of early child welfare (under 6 years of age).  In order to explore the policies, services 
and institutional circumstances of both models the welfare provisions were order within the two 
specific areas: Child protection services and health services.   
 
For the collection of data I used semi structures interviews with experts and servants. The 
interviews were divided in two sections, the first one aimed to explore general institutional 
features, whereas the second aimed to gather specific implementation conditions. To guide this 
second part a tool was develop. The tool consists of two multiple case scenario grills used to 
enquire social professional and experts on each area. Questions in relation to the services, 
institutional conditions and policy framework were organized along the four descriptive 
dimensions consider: provider (public - private), coverage (minimal - extended), accessibility 
(selective – universal), and quality (high - low). Supplementary official texts were used to 
corroborate and clarify certain information provided by the experts. The content of transcript of 
interviews was analyzed fallowing the principles of a qualitative ethnographic analysis. 
 
1.8. Research outline  
 
The organization of this dissertation fallows eight steps. First I provide a brief overview of 
previous research done on the area of policy transferability. Thereafter, in the theoretical 
framework I introduce the main notions used to analyze the data. Concepts and models within the 
topic of political development, and implementation will be barrow from Rothstein and 
Fukuyama.  Fallowing, present the methodological approach and design. Later, I organized the 
findings and analysis in two chapters for practical reasons, one discussing the policy issue, and 
the other the policy transferability. Fallowing I will draw general conclusion and frame the 
contribution of this study. Finally I attach supplementary information in the form of annex.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2. Knowledge Base  
 
In this chapter, I outline the literature review relevant to this study. I start the by discussing the 
path-dependency in policy learning strategies issue better known as, getting to Denmark (2.1). 
Then I provide a brief overview of research done in the field of policy transferability (2.2), to 
later introduce the laboratory federalism (2.3) and the Open Method of Coordination (2.4) as a 
formal tool of policy leaning. Finally, in 2.4, I situate Norway and Bolivia, emphasizing their 
current conditions and social welfare strategies and structure.   
 
2.1. Getting to Denmark and policy learning  
 
When modeling modern political institutions, certain standards have largely been assumed as the 
target stage of political and institutional evolution. For the developed world, this yardstick has 
been settled by the ideal of “Denmark”, as a mythical realm which is stable, democratic, peaceful, 
prosperous, inclusive, and low in corruption (Fukuyama, 2011, pp.14). In this context, some 
understand the challenge of creating modern political institutions as finding a way to get to 
Denmark. However, the agenda of forcing extreme poor and chaotic countries to transform with 
this exclusive target is an unrealistic task. It is not only that institutions reflect the cultural values 
of certain society, but that their development is also dependent on a unique struggle (ibid).   
 
Whether new welfare states are to follow a pattern defined by the western yardsticks or not is still 
a controversial point in the academic field. For some scholar continents, regions, countries and 
communities had experienced different patterns of development to those of the western world and 
therefore, development as a monostatic concept is no longer admissible. For them, it is either the 
uneven pace of industrialization what led to uneven development of social security schemes 
(Hubber and Bogliaccini, 2010), or the ethno-cultural variety that traversed diverse historical 
paths (Riesco, 2009). Whatever the case, what is strongly emphasized is the need to respect each 
country’s path (Draibe and Riesco, 2009). On the other hand, other group of scholars argue the 
contrary. For them regions such as Latin America follow to some extent the terms of western 
typologies, such as the one proposed by Esping-Anderse (Arts and Gelissen, 2010).  
 
Regardless who is right or wrong, the possibility to learn from previous experiences is a resource 
that not many countries can afford to ignore. Within the field of policy learning it is possible to 
enhance a process of contribution without the risk of deterministic development and dependent 
learning (Gough and Therborn, 2010). Policy leaning assumes that the replication of specific 
conditions is not necessary in order to exploit the resourceful experiences from abroad; it leaves 
room for the emergence of autonomous social policy within a context of cooperation.  
 2.2. Policy transferability research review 
 
2.2.1. Conceptual overview 
 
Policy transfer or lesson drawing are widely understood as a process by which development in a 
political system is built on the past or present knowledge of policies, administrative 
arrangements, institutions and ideas on another political system either within or between different 
political contexts (Dolowitz, & Marsh, 2000; Evans, 2009; Benson and Jordan, 2011), and in this 
context, policy transfer can be understood as a theory of policy development (Evans, 2009). 
According to Benson and Jordan (2011) the concept of policy transfer mutated from its early 
stage of policy innovation. Early research of policy transfer was conducted under the concept of 
policy innovation that emphasized learning within and between particular federal states and cities 
in the United Stated. It was later that under the concept of lesson drawing it shifted to the 
voluntary act of transfer by rational actors working in specific political contexts. However, the 
scope was still narrowed to both rational and voluntary processes, therefore David Dolowitz and 
David Marsh in 1996 coined a new term: policy transfer to emphasize both voluntary and 
coercive forms of policy innovations.  
 
Research in policy transfer currently takes the form of three major approaches (Benson & Jordan, 
2011). The first one, groups research that aims to develop theories of policy transfer (s.e. Rose, 
2005; Bulmer, Dolowitz, Humphreys and Padgett, 2007). The second, studies of empirical value 
used to study specific policy areas (s.e.  Pierson, 2003; Stone, 2004; Jones and Newburn, 2006) 
and the many actors that are involved (s.e. Bulmer et al., 2007; Stone, 2004; 2010) The third, 
research that has adopted a normative stance, promoting policy transfer as a means  for policy 
innovation (s.e. Rose, 2005). 
 
2.2.2. Agents of Policy Transfer  
 
A review done by Dolowitz and Marsh (1996) identified six types of actors engaged in transfer 
activities: elected officials, political parties, bureaucrats/civil servants, pressure groups, policy 
entrepreneurs/experts, and supra-national institutions. To this list Evans (2009) adds two more: 
knowledge institutions (KIs), academicians and other experts; and global financial institutions. 
Additionally, transfer occurs across different levels, at horizontal and vertical level within states 
but also across borders (Betsill and Bulkeley, 2004), with the mediation of instance such as 
transnational corporations, intergovernmental norm diffusers and global financial institutions 
(Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000; Stone, 2004; Evans, 2009), or the coordination between parties such 
as the one known as peer-to-peer transfer between national governments (Dolowitz, 2003).  
 
2.2.3. Objects of transfer  
 
Reviews and research has been conducted to identify the different objects that could be subject or 
are often subject to transfer. A group of objects of transfer are those known as ‘hard’ elements 
such as policy instruments, institutions and programs (s.e. Dolowitz, 2003; Jones and Newburn, 
2006). Another group of objects are known as softer elements, such as ideas, ideologies and 
concepts (Stone, 2004).  
 
2.2.4. Forms of policy transfer 
 
Typically, policy transfer analysts refer to three different processes of transfer: voluntary transfer 
or lesson-drawing, negotiated transfer and direct coercive transfer (Evans, 2009; pp.245). 
According with Evans’ (2009) review, the first is a rational action-oriented approach that emerge 
from professional dissatisfaction, poor performance, or a new policy agenda; whereas the second 
and third involve varying degrees of coercion common in developing countries, being the latest 
and purest form of involuntary action.  
 
2.2.5. Policy transfer, scope of studies in the future 
 
Benson and Jordan (2011) reviewed publication in the last three decades related to the field of 
policy transfer. They come to notice that not only studies within this field have significantly 
declined since 2005, but that also three trajectories for the future studies were clear. This first 
one, has to do with the continual evolution of the concept as it develops further theoretical and 
empirical perspectives. The second one, was the possibility of assimilation of the concept as part 
of other areas of knowledge (s.e. Marsh and Sharman, 2009 cross-fertilization attempt between 
knowledge of diffusion and transfer). And the final one arguments that policy transfer may either 
continue to evolve or enter a period of conceptual decay. 
 
2.2.6. The knowledge problem when policy transfer  
 
The issue of policy innovations and policy learning in which best policies are identified by 
comparing a number of already implemented practices is a recently emerging method (Noaksson 
and Jacobsson, 2003; Arrowsmith, Sisson and Marginson, 2004; Kerber & Eckardt, 2007) 
 
The main issue when talking about policy innovation is the knowledge problem Kerber and  Eckardt, 
2007). What is actually an optimum policy? How do we define that in order to share and transfer 
positive tactics? To this respect, Hayek (1978) conducted some studies about highly complex 
systems, reaching the conclusion that knowledge is limited on how to intervene in modern 
complex societies and therefore an approach of trial and error is the best alternative. Moreover, 
methods of policy innovation such as the Open Method of Coordination and Laboratory 
Federalism, are only effective if countries have a high capability of innovativeness and 
adaptability in regard to its policies and institutions (Kerber, 2006). So the issue of policy 
innovation and transfer is not only how to asses good practices and policies; but the necessary 
conditions in recipient countries to assume the innovative process.  
 
2.2.7. Some comparative studies of policy transfer  
 
Research in the field of policy transfer has focused in examining the conditions surrounding the 
process as such. They have examined the circumstances that facilitate and the extent to which 
influence has taken place between different models and countries.  Thus research in this field 
have examined how policy transfer serves as a tool for policy development. However, little 
attention has been paid to policy transfer as a tool for policy designes, this is documenting how 
policy transfer can be used as an instrument to enhance future changes in policy arrangement, 
policy transfer with a scope to the future.  
 
Most policy transfer studies have focused on highly developed countries (s.e. Dolowitz and 
Marsh 1996; 2000; Evans, 2004). Randma and Kruusenberg (2012) conducted a study aiming to 
contribute to the existing literature on policy transfer in new democracies. Their study took 
Estonia and Latvia as exemplifier cases of transitional policymaking and the emergence of new 
policies. By applying a comparative case study design, they found that: 
 
- Choosing policy transfer as a tool for policy-making was mainly caused by factors related 
to post-communist transition: shortage of domestic expertise and funding, transitional 
urgency in decision-making, and willingness for west-like development. 
- Temporal aspects of policy-making are particularly important.  
- The choice of role models is determined and depends on factors such as budgetary 
constraints, willingness, etc. 
- Administrative capacity is a key concern in policy transfer in immature policy 
environments, as it could lead to poor capacity for policy analysis, biased selection of role 
models and democratic deficit.  
 
Using a similar design, Blum (2014) conducted a study aimed to explore the extent to which 
family policy reforms in Germany and Austria were influenced by vertical and horizontal policy 
transfers. His results show that not all policies consider by the reforms were influenced and that 
the ones that were varied in object and extent. Transfer between these countries was an example 
of a constant and partly institutionalized exchange. He argues that the level of influence was such 
that family policy reforms could not be fully understood without the consideration of cross-
national policy transfers.  
 
Another example is the research done by Fawcett & Marsh (2012) that explored the factors that 
affect the success of policy transfer using a putative example of successful policy transfer, the 
Gateway Review between 2001 and 2010. The Gateway policy was developed in the UK, 
disseminated within and later transferred to Australia, New Zealand and the Netherlands. Results 
suggested that the policy was both a process success and a programmatic success; the reason of 
such was because it was informed, complete and appropriate. Fawcett & Marsh (2012) argue that 
far from a quick fix, successful transfer depends on extensive prior investigation about highly 
demanding commitment from politicians and, especially, public servants.  
 
As these three exemplifier research show, attention has mostly been centered on the conditions 
that made policy transfer successful, the difference form that transfer takes in terms of extent and 
objects, the motivation factors, etc. All aiming to reach a better comprehension of policy transfer 
as a tool of policy development and therefore improve it’s use. However, research of policy 
transfer in the making, with a scope to the future is a largely unexplored field.  
 
 2.3. Laboratory Federalism: an Approach for Policy 
Innovation and Policy Learning 
 
There are two main avenues when it comes to formal mechanisms to share good policies and 
practices by comparing a number of already implemented strategies (Kerber and Eckardt, 2007). 
One of these avenues is Federalism as a decentralized system. 
 
“Federal multi-level systems of jurisdictions can be seen as innovation systems, in 
which public policies are the object of a continuous process of innovation and 
imitation, driven by decentralised experimentation and competition” (ibid; pp.6) 
 
Therefore, the issue of policy innovation and policy learning is a matter of how to design 
appropriate federal multi-level systems of jurisdictions (Kerber and Eckardt, 2007).  The concept 
of "laboratory federalism" is based on the idea that competitive federalism can be a suitable 
institution for the generation and spreading of knowledge about superior policies (Kerber, 2000; 
2006). In this context, three different competitive transmission mechanisms are possible (Kerber 
and Budzinski, 2003; Kerber and Eckardt, 2007):  
 
- Pure yardstick competition: where countries learn from each other about the success or 
failure of their policies by mutually observing their policy performance in contrast to a 
foreign "yardstick". Their intra-jurisdictional political competition incentivizes the 
generation of policy innovations  
- Inter-jurisdictional competition: where the danger of losing resources to and from other 
jurisdictions are an incentive for the jurisdictions to increase their competitiveness in 
order to attract and keep the mobile of goods, production factors, firms, and individuals  
- Regulatory competition: when individuals and firms enjoy free choice of law regardless 
of their location. Competition among legal rules emerges having positive effects in the 
generation and diffusion of new legal rules  
 
2.4. Open Method of Cooperation: as an Institution for 
Supporting Policy Learning 
 
Another exemplifier of formal mechanism of transferability and policy learning towards the 
future is the Open Method of Coordination (OMC). The OMC is a new governance method 
(Kerber and Eckardt, 2007) developed by the European Commission to exchange good practice 
on the way European Union Member States design and implement policies and funding schemes 
within many policy areas (European Commission, 2015). Through an exchange of experiences 
and cross criticism, it stimulates emulation between Member States, stimulates diffusion of 
innovations and adaptation of welfare models, and facilitates follow-up procedures, assessment 
and transparency by using targets and indicators (Ferrera, Matsaganis, and Sacchi, 2002). By 
encouraging a learning dynamic this method has a strong potential for influencing policy 
development and promoting a knowledge base practice. The advantages of this formal 
mechanism is that it serves its purpose while respecting national diversity. Ultimately reconciling 
common European action with legitimate national diversity (Zeitlin, 2005).  Additionally, it 
mobilizes the diversity within Europe as an asset instead of an obstacle (Zeitlin, 2005; European 
Commission DG EMPL, 2002; Cohen and Sabel, 2003).  
 
The impact of the OMC is been felt at different levels. It has influenced substantive policy 
changes as well as governance and policymaking arrangements (Zeitlin, 2005). Moreover, the 
OMC is a two level game which combines top-down and bottom up practices (Ferrera et. al., 
2002). It promotes interest on learning from each other when preparing domestic policy reforms, 
while at the same time gives foot to bottom to top flow of information where nationally designed 
programs have been modified according to the experiences or needs of the lower territorial levels 
(ibid).  
 
The idea of decentralized experimentation and mutual learning can be found in both OMC and 
the Laboratory Federalism. A comparative study conducted between these two mechanisms by 
Kerber and Eckardt (2007) in regards to their capability to establish permanent learning processes 
for public policies, showed that OMC as a more centralized top-down method of benchmarking 
and spreading best practices, and laboratory federalism as a more decentralized bottom-up 
approach able to foster processes of policy learning. The scope of the OMC narrows to the 
diffusion of policies, whereas laboratory federalism serves policy innovations and policy 
diffusion. However, this study also found that although the OMC implies lower costs by avoiding 
parallel assessments through a centralized approach it also entails the potential dangers of 
centralization and harmonization: decisions as outcome of political bargaining processes, and 
lock-in effects and path dependency.  
 
2.5. Situating Norway and Bolivia  
 
2.5.1. The Norwegian and Bolivia welfare models  
 
Norway’s Social-Democratic Model   
 
One of the most recognized and used categorization of welfare models in the academic field is 
the one proposed by Esping-Andersen (Del Valle, 2010). For Esping-Andersen (1990) welfare 
models can be identified along two fundamental dimensions: the degree of decommodification 
and social stratification. This is the degree to which different models rely on the market, the state 
or the family to correct the negative outcomes resulting from inequalities (Esping-Andersen, 
1990; Arts and Gelissen, 2002; Del Valle, 2010).   
 
In contrast to the liberal model and the conservative corporatist model, the social-democratic 
model achieves both high level of decommodification and low stratification (ibid). Norway is a 
typical example; their social-democratic principles translate into generous universal and highly 
distributive benefits. Social policies aim to maximize the capacities for individual independence 
through high labor market participation, which is a feature that is also essential to maintain the 
high-level of solidarity (s.e. Arts and Gelissen, 2002; Lister, 2009; Kautto, 2010). Moreover, in 
regards to child welfare provisions, the state assumes a broad responsibility of ensuring 
appropriate conditions for the upbringing of children, thus rates high on de-familiarization, the 
degree to which the state benefits reduces individual’s dependency on kinship (Gilbert, Parton 
and Skivenes, 2011). 
 
The Nordic nirvana (Lister, 2009) defines the social-democratic model as the best of all possible 
thinkable worlds  marrying economic competitiveness with social justice (Kangas and Palme, 
2005). Where equality, solidarity, and universalism are values underpinning its commitment to 
the principle of inclusionary and equal citizenship (Lister, 2009; pp.246), representing a useful 
lesson for contemporary debates on democratization, development and inequality and a 
development strategy rather than an end state (Mkandawire 2005). 
 
Bolivia and the Latin-American Welfare Models
1
  
 
Although Esping-Andersen’s welfare typology provides an exquisite guidance to understand the 
industrialized world, in Latin-America other parameters have been more suitable (s.e. Filgueira, 
1998; Barba, 2004; Mesa Lago, 2004). In fact in this continent  
 
“[…] we can refer to a dual social protection system that needs to be interpreted not 
as consequence of residual approach of the welfare state, rather as a result of the 
interaction between the occupational model and the specific characteristics of the 
labor market, the functioning of the family and parental system and intergenerational 
relations, and the solidarity nets as means to guarantee financial support and care for 
the individuals” (Del Valle, 2010; pp.72) 
 
Several studies have been conducted in the attempt to understand and organize the welfare 
models in the developing world. Wood (2004) analysis of Africa, Asia and Latin America, 
concluded that for the latest a major characteristic is the informality element. Here States have 
little control over the market, selective schemes and services and therefore rely on the family and 
social network as the main provider of welfare. This means that social security schemes depend 
on the formal employment, leaving informal workers uncovered and under the protection of 
traditional care systems like the family (Barrientos, 2004).   
 
 Bolivia can be described as an intermediate model, having developed social security schemes 
during the 40s and 50s (Mesa Lago, 1989), with an exclusive regime, where an elitist social 
security system enlarges the gap between social groups and low social expenditure (Filgueira, 
1998; Barba, 2004). In respect to the latest Abdullahi (2009) conducted research to explore if 
leftist government in Bolivia and Chile during the last decade had impacted the social welfare 
distribution and size of welfare transfer per inhabitant or not. The results showed that although in 
Bolivia there was an increase on the representation of excluded social groups, the reaction of 
formal sector workers, banking community, conservative elements in the government, and weak 
democratic institution created an environment of instability, and therefore increases in size of 
welfare transfer and distribution was limited.  
                                                 
1
 For further information regarding the welfare provisions in Bolivia: IRIARTE, Gregorio O. M. I. (2004), "Análisis 
Crítico de la Realidad", 15ª Ed. Grupo Editorial Kipus, Cochabamba-Bolivia   
 
 
 2.5.2. Comparative Figures  
 
According with peer-reviewers and Navarro (Permanent Representative of Bolivia to the United 
Nations Office at Geneva), important progress has been achieve in Bolivia especially in regards 
to women’s and indigenous peoples participation, and conditional cash transfers schemes to 
vulnerable sectors of society (The United Nations Office at Geneva, 2015).  
 
Table I: Human Development Comparative Measurements by 2013
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INDICATOR Indicador descripción Range  express in 
Human Development 
Norway Bolivia 
Human 
Development 
Index  
Based on long healthy 
life, being knowledgeable 
and have decent standard 
of living 
Very high  
High       
Medium 
Low 
 
Rank 1 -
187 
0.890 
0.735 
0.614 
0.493 
 
1-187 
0.944 
 
 
 
 
1 
0.667 
 
 
 
 
113 
Health  index Life expectancy at birth  Very high  
High       
Medium 
Low 
 
0.926 
0.838 
0.737 
0.605 
0.946 0.727 
Education Index Calculated using Mean 
Years of Schooling and 
Expected Years of 
Schooling 
n.a. 0.910 0.674 
GDP Sum of gross value added 
by all resident producers 
in the economy, expressed 
in international dollars 
divided by total 
population  
Very high  
High       
Medium 
Low 
 
40,397 
12,920 
5,875 
2,830 
62,858 5,650 
Income Index GNI per capita Very high  
High       
Medium 
Low 
0.905 
0.738 
0.617 
0.509 
0.976 0.607 
Population 
living below 
$1.25 per day 
(%) 
 
Percentage of the 
population living below 
the international poverty 
line $1.25 a day 
(last update 2008) 
Very high  
High       
Medium 
Low 
1.0 
8.7 
18.0 
33.7 
 15.6 
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 Unless different specify  
Inequality-
adjusted HDI 
 
HDI value adjusted for 
inequalities in the three 
basic dimensions of 
human development. 
Very high  
High       
Medium 
Low 
0.780 
0.590 
0.457 
0.332 
0,891 0.470 
Income Gini 
Coefficient  
Measure of the deviation 
of the distribution of 
income among individuals 
or households within a 
country from a perfectly 
equal distribution. 
A value of 0 represents 
absolute equality, a 
value of 100 absolute 
inequality. 
25.8 56.3 
Expenditure on 
education, 
Public (%) 
 
Total public expenditure 
(current and capital) on 
education expressed as a 
percentage of GDP. 
Very high  
High       
Medium 
Low 
5.3 
4.6 
3.7 
3.8 
6.9 7.6 
Expenditure on 
health, 
 
Total health expenditure 
is the sum of public and 
private health 
expenditure. Express in 
total (% of GDP) 
 
Very high  
High       
Medium 
Low 
12.2 
6.0 
4.6 
4.2 
9.1 4.9 
Maternal 
mortality ratio  
 
Ratio of the number of 
maternal deaths to the 
number of live births in a 
given year, expressed per 
100,000 live births. 
Very high  
High       
Medium 
Low 
15 
42 
186 
426 
7 190 
Under-five 
mortality rate  
 
Probability of dying 
between birth and exactly 
age 5, expressed per 1,000 
live births. 
Very high  
High       
Medium 
Low 
6 
15 
47 
94 
3 41 
Children under-
five who are 
stunted 
 
Percentage of children 
ages 0–59 months who 
are more than two 
standard deviations below 
the median height-for-age 
of the World Health 
Organization  Child 
Growth Standards. 
Very high  
High       
Medium 
Low 
4.0 
11.1 
40.5 
41.0 
 27.1 
 
Author: Self-production, based on Human Development Report 2014  
 
However, in the opinion of international organizations like the Human Rights Watch, Franciscans 
International, Action Canada for Population and Development, Amnesty International, United 
Nations Watch, the conditions are far from optimal performance; concerns in regards to 
implementation mechanism are prevalent.  
 
Figures from The United Nations Human Development Report (2014) describe a Bolivia with 
significant weaknesses ranking in position 113 out of 187. As table I shows, Bolivia scores in 
most HD indicators significantly lower than Norway. On its part, the Scandinavian country is in 
leading position when it comes to HD ranking world wide, scoring Very High in all Human 
Development Indicators, whereas Bolivia scores between a Medium to Low. Although the south 
American country shows a growing economy with a GDP and Income Index ranking medium, 
still 15,6% of the population lives under the international poverty line, with an uneven 
distribution of wealth: inequality is as double as in Norway with a Gini Coefficient of 56.3. 
Attempts to improve the conditions of the population through a very high assignation of budget 
to education, doesn’t encompass with the low health budget. Figures also show alarming 
challenges in regards to children under five. With a 190 out of 1000 maternal mortality rate to a 7 
in Norway, 41 to 3 mortality rate for children under five, and a prevalence of 59 of children who 
are started.   
 
2.5.3. Contextualizing Bolivia 
 
In the past, circumstances surrounding development in Latin America were rather different than 
those experienced by the western world. In general terms, the industrial capitalism wave enforced 
further political development in the global north, as it incited more challenges to the unready 
global south (Nullmeier 2010; Gough & Therborn 2010; Peña, 2012). In fact, in Latin American 
social programs were badly focused or ineffective, characterized by a regulated citizenship that 
led to a regressive social security system and scheme and higher inequality levels (Aspalter 
2013).   
 
Nevertheless, different countries in Latin America had followed different development patterns.  
Democratization was reached in different terms and stages. This in combination with the uneven 
pace of industrialization, determined an uneven development of social security schemes between 
the different countries (Huber & Bogliaccini, 2010).   
 
Some countries had just recently entered a race for reaching better social, economic and political 
outcomes. This is the case for Bolivia, where in the last couple of decades it has become crucial 
that reduction of income inequality and poverty through the allocation of higher social 
expenditure and new legislative frameworks (ibid). Like in Europe, the new challenges come in 
hand with the demand of social rights and an institutional order that can fulfill the duty of 
securing the welfare of its citizens. In this context, stress is put on political development as a tool 
to ensure the rule of law and democracy, but also as a necessary step into the construction of a 
common goal (s.f. Aroncena; 2008; Peña, 2012) – a sense of national identity. For Bolivia, state 
building and further political development cannot be achieved only by increasing the basic 
incomes or raising the income per capita. Development in the Bolivian context means the 
development of mechanisms that can enable a growing range of freedoms (Sen, 1990). In fact, 
effective social policy regimes should not only work towards lowering the levels of poverty and 
inequality, but also increase the levels of human capital (Huber and Bogliaccini, 2010). In 
Bolivia, major changes result from major challenges. Peña (2012) describes this:  
 
“[…] unveiling off a state crisis involving: The insufficiency and corruption of the 
mechanisms of social representation, the existence of a fallacious governance because 
it is based on agreements that reproduce just the surface of democratic formality, and 
the almost total absence of social mobility in the spaces of political representation” 
(pp.9).  
 
In fact, the country ranks low in governance and freedom international reviews. The World Bank 
Institute’s Worldwide Governance Indicator (WGI) that measures governance rated Bolivia has 
having very poor conditions – all negative values in a scale from -2.5 to +2.53, in all dimensions. 
Similarly, Freedom House, an independent watchdog organization dedicated to the expansion of 
freedom around the world, classified Bolivia as partly free
4
. 
 
Bolivia has entered this century with an impetus to work on these challenges. In regards to the 
major legislative changes, by the beginning of 2009, a new constitution was ratified by popular 
election. Bolivia’s new vision encompasses with principles established by international standards 
such as the International Declaration of Human Rights and the United National Convention for 
The Rights of the Child.  
 
The Framework Law of Autonomy and the Framework Law of Participation and Social Control 
were key steps for the country’s new democratic era. Indeed, Bolivia’s new constitutional order 
was the result of a new political pact, which includes territorial, political, social, cultural and 
economic arrangements under the wellbeing (Vivir Bien) paradigm (Peña, 2012). As expressed 
by the president at the time, Evo Morales Aima, the new constitution mirrored a Bolivia base on 
Unity, Equality and Dignity, continuing the democratic and cultural revolution, a permanent 
liberation process started from the time of the Spanish colony (El País, 2009). These principles 
assured an inclusive citizenship for the diversity composing the country (Kymlicka 2002). As 
well as avenues for legitimizing the new agenda through a new order of participation and 
representation (f.e. Article 26 New Constitution in  Asamblea Constituyente de Bolivia 2008).  
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 World Bank Institute’s Worldwide Governance Indicator (WGI), online: 
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#reports, retrieve on 12.03.2015 
4
  Freedom House, online https://freedomhouse.org/country/bolivia#.VTNDspPg-Dl, retrieve on 12.03.2015 
3. Theoretical Framework: An Institutional 
Perspective 
 
Outlining my theoretical framework, in this chapter, I first give reasons why the main 
perspectives lean on institutional theory (3.1). Next, I introduce the premise to have a working 
modern state (3.2). In section 3.3. I give a general overview of the relation exiting between 
normative and practical implementation matters, to later discuss the normative premises of what 
is expected as the functions and scope of the state (3.4). Lastly, I look into how welfare reforms 
and new institutional design may be implemented in a successful way (3.5).  
 
This theoretical framework centers on understanding of political development through the means 
of policy transferability, focusing on the perspective of future needs in a framework of 
institutional analysis. This will be discussed in this chapter with two targets in mind. Firstly, the 
policy issue, examining the conditions behind a successfully working state, where an institutional 
analysis is used as the main theoretical background. Here, the dimensions of political 
development considered by Fukuyama’s theory are combined with Rothstein’s scope of the 
normative institutional arrangements. Secondly, the transferability issue, examining the condition 
behind a successful implementation of policies, and providing grounds over which institutional 
and policy changes can be enforced in order to secure better levels of service and overall social 
and political development. Here Rothstein’s implementation components are explored as 
necessary conditions for a successful implementation of social policies and transferability.  
 
Political development 
 
An institutional perspective in the analysis and design of social policies, is closely linked to the 
concept of political development. Political development can be consider as the change over time 
in political institutions (Fukuyama; 2014). As such, political development is a construct difficult 
to apprehend from a single point of view. It is often confused or reduce to a certain amount of its 
components, relevant to the historical circumstances or the predominant academic language at the 
time (Pye, 1965; Sen, 1988). Efforts to study development have been unsuccessful as scientist 
end up studying other analytical surrogates (Moses, 2011). Consequentially, the concept of 
political development has been attributed with different connotations, sometimes even 
disemboguing into overlapping typologies. Some of these definitions describe political 
development as: the political prerequisite of economic growth, the politics typical of industrial 
societies, the process of political modernization, the operations of a nation-state, the 
administrative and legal development, and the provenance of freedom of choice for its citizens 
and the building of democracy, among others (Pye, 1965; Sen, 1988).  
 
As a result, the tendency has been to either catalogue even more definitions, as the work done by 
Riggs (1981) summing up to sixty-five different views of political development, or to narrow and 
try to integrate the different connotation into one. For the latter, two are the definitions relevant to 
this study. First, political development as a process of social change, result of the integration of 
different spheres. The second, political development as freedom of choice. Regarding the first, 
Pye (1965) identified political development as a multi-dimensional process of social change.  In 
her view, political development revolves around the relationship between: the political culture, 
authoritative structures, and general political process (Pye, 1965; Moses, 2011).  
 
Another possible route taken to define political development in a more integrated way has been 
done by Sen (1999), achieving even a greater success than Pye in freeing the concept of political 
development from the dominant economic tradition and taking it to a more holistic and social 
realm. Amartya Sen argued that agency and human capabilities are the dimensions holding the 
same relevance as more traditional measures of utility and welfare, and have in fact a central role 
in securing development (Moses, 2011). For Sen, development is not about promoting and 
securing economic growth rather it is about providing an environment in which individuals are 
free to exercise their full potential. She believes that by removing the constraints such as: 
poverty, tyranny, poor economic opportunities, systematic social deprivation, neglect of public 
facilities, intolerance and over-activity of repressive states, and providing the opportunities 
necessary, citizens will be entitled to perform their agency (Sen, 1999; pp. 3). 
 
 In this thesis, both perspectives of Pye and Sen are combined using an institutional analysis of 
political development. As it will develop later, an analysis and intervention based on institutions 
can open the possibility of social and political development through institutional design, as 
institutions can also be a source of change and not just the reflection of the traditional dimensions 
- the economic, cultural and social conditions - by which development was explained in the past. 
Therefore, here in this thesis, political development can be understood as a relation between the 
political culture, the authoritative structures, and the general political process by which 
institutions arrange providing an environment where agency and human capabilities are ensured 
and promoted, enhancing the possibility for individuals to exercise their full potential within a 
certain society.  
 
3.1. An institutional perspective 
 
In the academic field, the study of political development has been constantly overruled by the use 
of the economic approach as the predominant strategy (Pye, 1965; Sen, 1988; Kuttenen and 
Petersen, 2011; Moses, 2011). The ways in which political development has been defined are 
development through economic growth or change in well-being (Moses, 2011; pp. 23). This also 
means that it is assumed as a solid-unit in which the economic sphere is predominant and the 
direct cause of variations at the social and political level (Fukuyama, 2011; 2014; Kuttenen and 
Petersen, 2011). Consequently there are two contradictory aspects that are commonly associated 
with political development. On one hand, there is a strong causal attribution of present 
circumstances to conditions that are particular to specific societies (Fukuyama, 2011; Rothstein, 
1998) and therefore impossible to replicate. While on the other, there is also the assumption of a 
unique metical target of development applicable without distinction for each and every society 
(Fukuyama, 2011).    
 
This conception results are problematic placing political development in a dilemmatic position 
where every society is recognized as having its own path, but asked at the same time to comply 
with a benchmark of development. By attributing development to singular causes, replicability 
becomes impossible. Simultaneusly, by recognizing this singular causality it also establishes a 
unique target to every society regardless of their difference. Alternatively, an analysis centered on 
the political institutions is capable of explaining the variation in social norms away from this 
structural determinism (Rothstein, 1998; pp. 217), minimizing this challenge. Based on the 
understanding of the coherence of each society, an institutional approach takes institutions as the 
central concept of interest to explain variations, but also tools to promote change towards a more 
coherent translation of the normative components into practical arrangements or to in fact 
transform the normative component through practical arrangements.  
 
In essence, a comprehension of differences between societies and their development by looking 
at social institutions turns the relationship between social norms and institutions upside down 
(ibid). Institutions are not only the reflex of social norms, but the manner in which political 
institutions are structured can also explain changes in this other sphere. Therefore, economic and 
social arrangements are no longer perceived as dependent only on external social factors such as 
culture, but rather difference can be traced back to the design of political institutions. The 
advantage of this institutional approach is the opening to new possibilities of social and political 
development through processes of institutional design and change.  
 
“If instead norms vary with the character of political institutions, then we as citizens 
have a critical role to play. We can, at least on some occasions, decide which norms 
shall prevail in the society we live in, because we can choose how to design our 
political institutions. It has proved possible, […] for centrally placed political actors 
to shape political institutions consciously, and in such a manner as to favor the 
generation of certain social norms (and interests)” (Rothstein, 1998; pp. 135) 
 
Development from an institutional approach can take the form of policy planning as the means to 
enforce institutions that better suit the necessities of certain community. Certain societies had 
been more successful in translating the “What institution should do” (normative component) into 
“What institutions can actually do” (practical component).  Therefore, through the share of 
institutional arrangements that had proved to be efficient in doing so, the advantage is the 
consolidation of a circuit in which institutions can enforce two different things: the translation of 
what is expected into practice, but also the modification through the practice of what is expected 
in order to adjust the welfare provisions to the changing necessities of society or specific social 
groups.  
 
3.2. General terms for working states: Institutional 
Development  
 
Fukuyama’s account of political development and political decay goes beyond the material 
conditions to the dimensions involved in the process, distilled from an historical account of the 
many interlocking factors involved in institutional evolution (Fukuyama, 2011). Its innovative 
scope combines the comprehension of each dimension of development as a unity of analysis, 
with its own coherence, developmental role, and inter-linkages (Fukuyama, 2011; 2014). By 
doing so, his theory covers a double perspective: the conditions under which political 
development takes place but also the circumstance of decay; both necessary to bring light on the 
characteristics of successful practices and the conditions of failure and possible improvement. 
Also, it highlights the evaluation of the aspects necessary to enhance political development far 
from a deterministic approach.  
 
To explore political development, institutions are a central unit of analysis, as they both reflect 
and play an active role in the process of change. According to Fukuyama (2014), political 
development takes place when systems successfully master their environmental demands, 
translating these arrangements into stable patterns of behavior named institutions. On the 
contrary, if there is a rigid preservation of patterns the tendency is a regression to traditional 
forms of power and authority where societies become less institutionalized, which in turn signals 
a state of political decay.  
 
In order to proceed with an analysis of political development, first one has to frame political 
development as a component of development as such. Fukuyama (2014) considers that 
development takes place within a context of four dimensions: economic growth, social 
mobilization, legitimacy, and political development.  
 
“The economic, social and political dimensions of development proceed on different 
tracks and schedules, and there is no reason to think that they will necessarily work in 
tandem. Political development, in particular, fallows its own logic independent of 
economic growth. Successful modernization depends, then, on the parallel 
development of institutions alongside economic growth, social change and ideas; it is 
not something that can be taken for granted as an inevitable concomitant of the other 
dimensions of development. Indeed, strong political institutions are often necessary to 
get economic growth going in the first place. It is precisely their absence that locks 
failed or fragile states into a cycle of conflict, violence and poverty” (Fukuyama, 
2014; pp.51)  
 
The political development is central in the comprehension of development beyond the economic 
and the culture-specific scope (Fukuyama, 2011). It explores how institutions are arranged and at 
the same time reflect the ideas behind the relation existing between the ones in power and the 
remaining citizens. As having an independent logic, it’s not illogical to analyze the conditions of 
political development in a way that is more or less independent from the other components of 
development; mostly when the development of these three set of instructions is a universal 
condition for growth at a social and economic real to all societies (Fukuyama, 2014).  
 
Figure 2. Dimension of development 
 
 
Source: Fukuyama, 2014; pp. 43 
 As showed in Figure 1, in order to understand political development, the emergence and 
coexistence of a set of three institutions need to be considered: the state, the rule of law, and the 
accountable government or democracy. The coexistence in equilibrium between these institutions 
is what determines at last the conditions of political development or political decay. What is 
expected as political development in modern liberal democracies is a healthy balance where the 
state concentrates and deploys power to enforce law, keep peace, defend, and provide public 
goods; while in parallel law and mechanisms of accountability constrain the state’s power and 
ensure that its power is used only in a controlled consensual manner (Fukuyama 2011; pp.16). In 
other words, the requirement for stability rests on the capacity of a system to discourage desires 
that conflict with the principles of justice, framing the nature of institutions and at the same time 
encouraging the virtue of justice in those who take part in them (Rawls, 1971;  Rothstein, 1998). 
On the contrary, if this balance breaks, the tendency of society is to become less institutionalized, 
turning back to more traditional forms of power, such as those present in more primitive forms of 
society – the tribal society (Fukuyama 2011), eventually leading to a state of political decay. 
However, this in any way means that decay is the result of an unbalance in favor of the state 
authoritative power only. In fact, things can become unbalanced in either direction. It can be the 
case of insufficient checks on state power, or excessive veto power on different social groups that 
prevent any sort of collective action (Fukuyama, 2014; pp.39). 
 
Despite all three institutions being essential to political development, one has a priority role. State 
building is not a precondition for the emergence of rule of law, nor democracy; but it is a neural 
in conducing political stability, as  the organ capable and responsible for enforcing the role of the 
reaming two other institutions. In fact, if democracy comes too early, when state is not yet strong 
to take on this task, consequences can be rather negative (Fukuyama, 2014). In these conditions, 
repatrionalization can take the form of corruption breaking the balance necessary for 
development and conducing to political decay. Indeed, in many countries democracy itself is 
threatened because the state is corrupt or too incompetent to fulfil its tasks of providing security, 
protecting property rights, making available education and public health services, and building 
the infrastructure that is necessary for private economic activities to occur (Fukuyama, 2014, 
pp.54). So sequencing is crucial: History has proven that both sorts of institutions may suffer 
when democracy is reached before the rule of law. In fact, Fukuyama (2014) provides clear 
examples of this situation. In his historical account of development and decay, the most modern 
contemporary bureaucracies were established by authoritarian states pursuing national security, 
like the case of ancient China or Prussia. In this cases their weak geopolitical position, forced 
them to compensate by developing an efficient state administration before democracy was even 
considered. On the contrary, countries that reached democracy too early ended up worst off than 
the countries that had the opportunity to first develop a working administration. The cases where 
democracy came before a modern administration, like in  United States, Greece and Italy, ended 
up with a clientilistic public sector and face greater difficulties in achieving high-quality 
governance (ibid; pp.29-30). Sequencing is also important for another reason. In the cases of 
Latin America, like Bolivia and Venezuela, democracy can in fact function against the 
construction of a national identity. State building ultimately rests on a foundation of nation 
building, and as the case of modern public administration, strong national identity is often most 
effectively achieved under authoritarian conditions (ibid, pp. 30). In consequence, conflicts on 
sharing a national narrative prevail, negatively impacting the conciliation and cooperation 
capacity, and even the legitimacy of broader actions as society is likely to be sectorized 
(Fukuyama, 2011).  
 
3.2.1. State Building: stateness and efficiency  
 
The state is an ancient human institution that allows individuals to coexist and cooperate towards 
common targets based on the use of cohesive power (Fukuyama, 2004). The functions of the state 
range from in a wide variety, from good to ill depending on how this power is practiced. In fact, 
the same power that allows the protection of rights and provision of safety can also be fuel for 
abuse. Therefore, in order to ensure functions that promote development politics have the role to 
tame the power of the state under the rule of law, by directing it towards legitimate ends 
(Fukuyama, 2004; 2011). As a result, different countries have reached different levels of 
stateness, having varied consequences on the capacity of politics to ensure development. Weak 
states are still in the necessity of state building, whereas strong states constantly push towards a 
weakened one, at least to some extent (Fukuyama, 2004). However, the emphasis put into the 
necessity of ensuring a sufficient state capacity and scope has no regards to the size of the state as 
such. What is argued here as state building is that much more important than the size of 
government is the quality in order to ensure a good economic and social outcome (Fukuyama, 
2015).  
 
Why is it state building important: The importance for stability or social justice 
 
In fact, the central idea of state building is its essential role in promoting two things: economic 
growth and social justice - stability. In relation to the latest, the relevance of state building is 
based on the fact that only through the monopoly of legitimate power persons are exhorted to 
cooperate beyond their individual interests (Fukuyama, 2004). Citizens’ wellbeing and social 
justice are based on the commitment to a common conception of good life, the pursuit of which 
being premised by fair social and political institutions which are fair (Rawls 1971; Kymlicka, 
2002). According to Fukuyama (2004; 2011; 2014), this is the balance achieved by the 
coexistence of the state, the rule of law and the accountable government. These are the three 
central institutions needed to have well-ordered political systems, the necessity of the last two 
being to counterbalance the state’s power. When effective, the three institutions combined will 
have a direct impact on the states effectiveness to provide social justice; this is to ensure good or 
at least minimal levels of living conditions.  
 
Well-functioning institutions create legitimacy circles. In fact, policy’s political legitimacy has a 
direct impact on the capacity of the state to carry out with programs successfully. Moreover, 
legitimacy as such is related to the level of trust that citizens hold towards their governmental 
institutions. No matter how well designed or well-organized its implementation, if a program or 
policy does not enjoy the confidence of the citizens, failure is at high risk (Rothstein, 1998).   
 
Why is it state building important: The importance for economic growth 
 
Well-functioning institutions also create an appropriate atmosphere for economic grow. State 
capacity is a necessary condition for economic growth, and in the particular case of liberal 
economies, economic growth is the answer to social justice. In fact, the rise of the modern 
economic world is the direct result of the capacity of the state to provide order, security, law and 
property rights (Fukuyama, 2004).  
 
Modification on the role of the state in the regulation of economic matters had contrasting 
implications for different countries. During the XX century, as result of the dysfunctions and 
inefficiencies of excessive state scope in totalitarian regimes, the healthy size function and scope 
of state was decreased on the international sight (ibid). The problem was that as consequence 
pressures for liberating the market ignored the different necessities of countries in relation to state 
building. Thus in countries where states power was needed to be cut back, at least in relation to 
their role in the market, benefited as it enhanced economic growth in the long run. However, a 
wide variety of countries in the former communist world (Latin America, Asia and Africa) the 
international pressure towards a lesser degree of state intervention in economic affairs did more 
harm than good. Agreements such as the “Washington consensus” under the wing of the 
Interntional Moneraty Found and World Bank, ignored the national agendas of state building, and 
in the absence of proper institutional framework, these counties were left worse off after 
liberalization, not been capable of cover and provide appropriate levels of care and wellbeing to 
their citizens (Fukuyama, 2004; 2011). In trying to reduce state scope, these reforms also reduced 
state strength (Fukuyama, 2003).  
 
“A critical issue facing poor countries that blocks their possibilities for economic 
development is their inadequate level of institutional development, they do not need 
extensive states, but they do need strong and effective ones with the limited scope of 
necessary state functions” (Fukuyama, 2004; pp.162).  
 
A model to explore states functions and capacity  
 
The way states are successful or not in securing these two objectives: social justice and economic 
development can be explored by looking at what Fukuyama (2004) calls degrees of stateness - 
this is the state’s functions and the capacity it has to carry on with this functions. According with 
theory of political development, states activities are organized along two axes as showed in 
Figure 2. To describe the characteristics that make a state strong and effective one can locate 
single institutions, as well as the states as a whole along this two continuums. Axis X identifies 
the scope of states activities; this is the functions and goals taken on by governments (Fukuyama, 
2003; 2004; 2014). Axis Y refers to the institutional capacity, the strength and quality of the state 
power or the ability of states to plan and execute policies and to enforce laws cleanly and 
transparently (Fukuyama, 2003; 2004; 2014), meaning to administrate efficiently and with 
minimal bureaucracy, to control graft, corruption and bribery, and to maintain high levels of 
transparency and accountability in their institutions (Fukuyama, 2004; pp.15). Thus, Y-axis 
address the capacity of the state to execute the control role that rule of law and democracy has 
over the state’s power. As in X-axis, there is no commonly accepted measure to address the 
strength of state institutions; however, the Corruption Perception Index, the International Country 
Risk Guide Number, the Governance Indicator, and Freedom of House had been largely 
recognized as tools to evaluate states strength (ibid).  
 
Additionally other strategies can be used, as the comparison between the normative and practical 
components of policy implementation proposed by Rothstein and to be explored later on 3.3. in 
general, and more specifically in 3.4. and 3.5. In fact, Rothstein suggests that the use of 
impartiality as a measure of government quality, a normative characteristic that correlates 
strongly with efficient performance, consequently it makes sense to use measures of dysfunction 
such as the perceived levels of government corruption (Fukuyama, 2014, pp. 59) 
 
Figure 3. Stateness and efficiency matrix: State’s scope and strength 
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    Quadrat III   Quadrat IV 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Fukuyama, 2004; pp. 14 
 
In modern societies, the central aim of the functions and scope of the state is to enforce an 
economic growth alongside social justice. By combining axis X and Y, a descriptive matrix with 
four quadrats can be built to evaluate stateness effectiveness in this double task. The matrix can 
be used to evaluate single agencies or states as a whole, with the purpose of comparing different 
institutions or states at a point in time, or to describe the dynamic nature of stateness by 
comparing a single institution at different points in time (Fukuyama, 2004).  
 
The location of the institutions or states along the four quadrats describes four different possible 
combinations of capacity and functions. The best and worst case scenarios depend directly upon 
the balance between these two dimensions. Fukuyama says quadrant I is where development can 
be successful and quadrant 4 is often wher e development efforts break down (Fukuyama, 2003).  
From an economic standpoint the favorable place to be is in quadrat I but it comes at the price of 
social justice (Fukyama, 2004).  If state combines a limited scope of functions and strong 
institutional effectiveness, the chances of successfully covering its ambitions is high, but the 
scope of coverage is minimal. On the other hand, if the state maintains its strong institutional 
effectiveness (Quadrat II) and increases as well its functions social provisions will grow but 
economic success will decrease. In fact the presumption is that economic growth will tend to fall 
as states move farther to the right along axis X (ibid). The problem for many countries in the past 
with reforms such as the Washington Consensus during the 90’s, was that reductions in state 
scope came together with a decreased state strength and rise of new demands, leaving states in 
quarter IV instead of I (ibid). The worst place for both goals is quadrat IV. If state moves forward 
on axis X but remains with low levels of institutional strength, neither economic growth nor 
social justice is secure. In this case, an ineffective state will be force to take on activities that 
cannot successfully fulfill, failing to secure even minimal standards (ibid). To sum up, 
 
“Quad 1 is optimal—strong, with minimal  provision of public goods. (eg.: U.S.)  
S
tr
en
g
th
 o
f 
st
a
te
 i
n
st
it
u
ti
o
n
s 
Scope of state functions 
Quad 2 (eg. Former Soviet Union, an d Western European welfare states)  
Quad 3 includes many failing and failed states (eg.: southern Africa)  
Quad 4 is worst—ambitious state without power to implement. (eg.: Pakistan)” 
(Fukuyama, 2003) 
  
This model will allow me to later situate Norway and Bolivia along these two dimensions and the 
four quadrats, in relation to two specific policy areas: the health and the child protection services 
for the first infancy (children under six year of age). 
 
3.2.2. Rule of Law 
 
In order to understand rule of law as an institution is necessary to clarify first the distinction 
between law and legislation. Law can be understood as a body of abstract rules that bind a 
community together; whereas legislation corresponds a function of political power also knows as 
positive law - the ability of a ruler to make and enforce new rules using a combination of power 
and authority (Fukuyama, 2011).  In this context, rule of law is different to legislation and a 
specific way of law. In fact, its functions is to contra-rest rulers political power through a set of 
socially accepted set of conducts that bind even the most powerful political actors in a specific 
society (Fukuyama, 2014).  
 
“The rule of law in its deepest sense means that there is a social consensus within a 
society that its laws are just and that they preexist and should constrain the behavior 
of whoever happens to be the ruler at a given time. The ruler is not sovereign; the law 
is sovereign, and the ruler gains legitimacy only insofar as he derives his just power 
from the law” (Fukuyama, 2011; pp.262). 
 
The regulatory role that rule of law holds onto the state’s power determines a constant state of 
tension between these two institutions (Fukuyama, 2014). The rule of law not only smoothens the 
process of regulating citizens and authorities behavior by avoiding constant renegotiation and 
setting common standards of behavior, but it can also have a harming effect as the law can also 
prevent rulers from doing things they would like to do, not on their own interest but also in the 
interest of the community as a whole (Fukuyama, 2011) 
 
Historically the rule of law was under the wing of institutions that ruled beyond the state or 
similar authorities. This origin has an effect on the way is shaped in the currents world 
(Fukuyama, 2004; 2011; 2014). For instance, the fact that in modern democracies the rule of law 
is likely to be managed by an independent organ from the executive power (Fukuyama, 2014) 
that is entitled to make new laws, but at the same time subjective and must function within the 
rule of law (Fukuyama, 2011). This could be traced back to the control role that the Catholic 
Church had onto the monarchies in Europe.   
 
Why is it rule of law important 
 
The historical accountability of the rule of law has also determined different levels of institutional 
development in different parts of the world. In contemporary developing countries, one of the 
greatest political deficits lies in the relative weakness of the rule of law (ibid). In fact, in larger 
parts of the world, like Latin America, its absence or weakness has devastating effects being one 
of the principal reasons why some of these poor countries can’t achieve higher rates of growth 
(ibid). In these countries, building rule of law can be complicated, as there is no direct avenue to 
ensure its presence, not even through democracy. Looking at the rule of law in contemporary 
conditions implies going beyond the contents of written constitution and the principles by which 
political authorities are subject to law. It takes the observation of the characteristics of 
embodiment of this rules (ibid).  
 
3.2.3. Accountable government: democracy 
 
Democratic accountability was the last institution to emerge after the state and the rule of law. 
Historically the central mechanism of accountability, the parliament, can be traced back to the 
institutions that represented the elites in society during feudal law and that later evolved into 
having a regulatory role over the power of the state to tax their citizens (Fukuyama, 2014) 
 
In general terms, accountability here is equivalent to modern democracy in the sense that it 
defines procedures that make governments responsive to the whole society rather than their own 
self-interests (Fukuyama 2011; 2014). There are mainly two types of accountability: Procedural 
accountability that takes the form of election by which citizens are entitled to choose and 
discipline their rulers through their votes; and substantive accountability by which rulers are 
bound to respond to the interests of the general society (Fukuyama, 2014). Although substantive 
accountability can function without procedural accountability, to secure the well function of 
democracy is assumed that at a point procedural accountability will be necessary as is the 
principal mechanism by which common good can be ensured (ibid).  
 
Accountability can be achieved in a number of different ways and looking at this ways provides 
hints on the characteristics and level of effectiveness that has to contra balance the state’s 
political power. Accountability on one hand can rise from moral education where authorities 
socialized into feeling responsibility for their society, like is the case of China (Fukuyama, 2011); 
as it can be result of formal procedures. Formal accountability depends on the conditions by 
which the government agrees to summit itself to certain mechanisms that limit its power. This 
mechanisms of control, likely contained in the constitutions as a form of rule of law, allow 
citizens to replace the government entirely on the grounds of malfeasance, incompetence or abuse 
of power though democratic election (ibid).  
 
3.2.4. Summary 
 
In this part, I have given account to the relevance of an institutional analysis in order to better 
understand processes of political development. I had situated and argued the pivotal role that the 
political sphere has into achieving greater outcomes in overall social and economic development. 
I had situated the concept of political development as freedom but also as the maturity of a 
coherent, sufficient, and integrated set of institutions. Just recently in Bolivia the reduction of 
income inequality and poverty had taken a central role in the political agenda. The main steps had 
been to higher the allocation of resources in social expenditure but also a new set of legislative 
frameworks (Huber and Bogliaccini, 2010).  However, political development does not depend 
solely on the improvement of economic conditions. For Bolivia, further political development 
cannot be achieved only by the increase of basic incomes or income per capita. Development in 
the context of countries that had experienced the corruption of their system means the 
development of mechanisms that can enable a growing range of freedoms (Sen, 1990).  
 
For these propose, in this section I also emphasized the state as a one the three fundamental 
institutions present in modern working states. The state was presented also as having a primary 
role into ensuring the well function of the other two institutions: rule of law and democracy. 
Sequencing in the process of political development was exposed as critical to avoid contesting 
conditions between the institutions. It was described the negative effects that reaching democracy 
before a sufficient stateness had in several countries, in which Bolivia can be subscribed. It is 
therefore evident the necessity for state building and further political development. Changes in 
legislation and budgetary assignation have to go along with a strengthening of the conditions and 
capacity of the state, enabling it to fully assume its responsibilities, a real practice of democracy – 
accountability.   
 
Coherently in this part I also emphasized the role of the rule of law and the accountable 
government in order to provide some level of contention to the power invested on the state, 
providing the healthy balance necessary for development. Being of central interest, a model to 
evaluate the state’s qualities was also explained centered on the valuation of the scope of 
functions and the capacity of fulfilling them.  
 
3.3. Specific institutional conditions: ideological and 
practical components of policy implementation 
 
As detailed before, the general terms of political development can be analyzed by looking at three 
crucial institutions: the state, the rule of law and the accountable government. However, to 
explore the conditions by which these institutions are able or unable to perform their role is 
necessary to have a look at the normative and practical components of the implementation. It was 
argued the central role that state has in securing the functions of the rule of law and democracy. 
Moreover the balance between these three basic political institutions is a crucial condition that all 
societies aim to target at some point in time (Fukuyama, 2014). In order to face an analysis of the 
institutional conditions that make a model A successful and a model B with clear pinpoint to be 
improved, with the aim of later using the experience of model A to improve model B, I here 
complement a general analysis of the institutional conditions with a more specific analysis of the 
characteristics of implementation - to what extent are the institutions of a certain society capable 
of translating “what the state should do” into “what the state can do”. 
 
Rothstein’s theory is bases on an extensive review of implementation research, by which he 
pretends to unite two ambitions perceived at the time as opposite: speculation and discipline 
(Rothstein, 1998). This characteristic is precisely what makes this theory relevant for a 
transferability analysis, as it attempts to say something about the shape of the future – the 
speculation component, but does so by going beyond a descriptive level to provide arguments for 
how policies should be framed in the future – the normative and empirical component. Rothstein 
(1998) argument is that:  
 
“For attempts to analyze the future represent an exercise in constructive theorizing, 
an attempt to make predictions concerning what is both possible and good. Such an 
enterprise requires a combination of empirical and normative analysis. If one is to say 
something about the future, both “can” and “should” must be addressed. It is 
meaningless in this context to discuss what the state should do separately from what 
in fact can do, and wholly inappropriate and unethical to try to answer what it can do 
without reflecting as well on what it should do” (pp.9).  
 
Analyzing normative and practical components: three premises 
 
So how do we analyze what the state should do, in contrast to what the state can actually do in 
the realm of implementation? To guide an analysis of this nature, one can dissent three different 
premises critical to this process.  
 
Firstly, Rothstein (1998) proposes that an analysis of welfare policy and its future must be based 
on a constructive discourse, only viable trough the combination of both normative and empirical 
discourses. The consequence is that what the state should do – normative component, must be 
looked at with equal relevance as to what the state can do – empirical component.  
 
Second, the premise establishes the importance of looking at the institutional conditions. Various 
formal systems of rules: constitutions, systems of taxation, programs; are all to be seen not only 
as rule-systems determining which strategies of action are rational and legitimate, but as 
established normative arrangements (Rothstein, 1998).  This premise adds something new to 
what Fukuyama (2004, 2011, 2014) considered relevant from the rule of law in relation to 
political development. For this author, rule of law provided certain standards by which authorities 
were also limited, ensuring that their actions correspond to the benefit of the broad society rather 
than their personal interest. However, for Rothstein (1998) this broad socially accepted ways of 
conduct are more than just rules, since they also effect what values are establish in society, 
regarded as common culture, collective identity, belonging, trust, and solidarity. Thus, 
institutions not only reflect the ideological arrangements of a society, but they in fact are a tool 
capable of also promoting changes.  
 
This is in fact the third premise relevant for an analysis of the normative and empirical 
component of political development. By analyzing the principles forming the fundaments of 
established and generally accepted institutions, it should be possible through and analogous 
reasoning to come to general normative principles for the framing of social policy in the future 
(ibid). 
 
3.4. Normative premises: Descriptive criteria for what 
the state should do 
 
What are the extents and the characteristics of the provisions that are attributed as responsibilities 
of the government? Is a question that directly depends on the nature of the relationship existing 
between citizens and the state. Different models reflect different levels of responsibilities 
attributed to each part, which in turn have implications in how the institutions are built and 
provisions arranged. In turn, institutions also reflect the ideological position in relation to the 
participation of each part in this concern. Kymlicka (2002) argument is that in some occasions 
some welfare states assume the largest responsibilities, allowing citizens to pursue their life 
projects from a neutral position ensuring that no specific pattern of life is prioritized over others. 
While in others, states attribute the larger responsibility to the communities, individuals or social 
network. The challenge for both positions is the same, how to ensure equality? And to what 
extent securing this is the responsibility of the state?  
 
3.5. Implementation premises: Descriptive criteria for 
what the state can do 
 
The successful implementation of policies rests on the capacity of the state to design and organize 
services with legitimate value. To explore this capacity Rothstein (1998) proposes two tools, the 
first one is a model that looks at the design, organization and legitimacy in terms of contents and 
procedures as the key elements for a succesfull implementation of policies. The second explores 
the policy theory (critical component of the design) as a precondition for the level of stress 
enforced onto the organization and legitimacy in terms of flexibility.   
 
Rothstein’s (1998) six major components model for implementation has basically two categorical 
features that organize the conditions of success or failure. The first features refer to where is the 
causes located among the different steps of implementation: the design, the execution, or the 
political legitimacy of the policy. The second features explore what is exactly that is failing 
within this condition: if it’s a matter of substance - problems in the content, or a matter of process 
- problems in the dynamic. In this respect, the challenge can be on how to adjust the objective to 
best fit the necessities of both clients and provider, or how to arrange the political system to 
operate in regards to this objectives (ibid).  
 
Figure 4. Six major categories of factors affecting policy implementation 
  
 Substance Process 
Desing  1. 2. 
Organization  3. 4. 
Legitimacy  5. 6.  
 
 
Source: Rothstein, 1998; pp. 73 
 
As showed in Figure 4, six are the different possible situations. In principle, a green light in each 
of the six boxes will ensure that the implementation of a program corresponds and fulfils the 
objectives that motivated its creation (Rothstein, 1998; pp.73). However conditions of certainty 
in this respect are rather rare. In most circumstances, successful implementation is a question of 
flexibility (ibid). It is a crucial element the capacity to accommodate the actions anticipated by 
the policy theory to the variances and the uncertainty that characterizes reality.  
 
Rothstein (1998; pp.114) devised a simple formula to explore the successful implementation of 
public policies by looking at the preconditions. As shown in Figure 4: he proposes that depending 
on the degree of certainty in the policy theory, more or less stress will be enforced onto the 
adaptive capacity of the organization, and the extent to which legitimacy will be necessary during 
the implementation stage. Therefore, the higher the uncertainty on the policy theory, the higher 
the pressure applied on the organization and legitimacy process. Whereas the more certainty on 
the policy theory, the simpler the tasks that the organization has to assume and the easier the 
legitimacy is achieved in the process of implementation.   
 
Figure 5. Preconditions for the successful implementation of public policy 
 
 Policy theory  Organization  Legitimacy  
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Broad targeting 
(static regulatory) 
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Source: Rothstein, 1998; pp. 114 
 
3.5.1. Substance of policy design 
 
The substance of a policy design is the first out of the six major components useful to examine 
the extent to which normative expectations can be effectively translated into actions.  According 
with Rothstein (1998), this component is about the degree of knowledge over the causes of a 
certain social problems, and the effect that this knowledge has on the design of the policy as such. 
In fact, a critical recommendation that the author derives from research is that clear and precise 
objectives are vital, and can be better achieved if those in the position of elaborating them have 
prior knowledge of the relation that existed between efforts and results in past experiences.  
 
However, knowledge is not the only fundamental cause by which the design can fail. The real 
applicability of a design also depends on other factors such as ethical, political, legal and 
economic conditions (ibid).  In certain circumstances, there are cases in which programs can also 
be purely symbolic or demand driven. These types of programs or policies are not aimed to solve 
the problem, rather there are elaborated as evidence to prove to the larger society that something 
is being done. It is often the case that programs of this nature are inspired by the pressure that 
authorities once a problem has been widely recognize by the society (ibid).  
 
3.5.2. Process of policy design  
 
The design of certain policy or program is not conducted in a vacuum; in fact, political conflicts 
often have relevant effects over the design outcome (Rothstein, 1998). During the design process, 
negotiations often take place between conflicting parts. One possible shortcoming of such 
situations can be the rendering to unclear or even contradictory objectives due to the 
preponderance of achieving a compromise (ibid). However, in order to achieve clear objectives, it 
does not mean that negotiation and compromises need to be avoided. In fact, both are inevitable 
and necessary steps. What is relevant is the level of coherence and clarity achieved in the design 
as well as the skills of those carying on with the duty of designing (ibid)– a matter of being 
accountable.   
 
3.5.3. Substance of Organizing  
 
The substance of organizing refers to several conditions that ensure an effective application of the 
designed measures. Based on a review of research in the area of policy implementation, Rothstein 
(1998) identifies the following as the most relevant attributes that ensure an effective practice: a 
motivated and capable staff, sufficient material resources, and a good level of coherence between 
the structure of the organization carrying with the task and the objectives of these policies, 
programs or services (ibid). In relation to this last aspect, a suitable avenue to explore the 
coherence organization-objectives is to look at the degree of adjustment to individual conditions 
demanded by the tasks. In case were adjustment is highly required, structures that allow 
flexibility are more suitable (ibid).  
  
3.5.4. Process of organizing 
 
The main problem in this component is the responsibility drift, better known as the “black hole of 
democracy” (Rothstein, 1998). Programs do not operate as depending on single organizations. 
Often they involved a number of different organizations along the continuum private-public, 
which coordination conduced to a complicated net of authority relations and levels of 
responsibility and accountability (ibid). Indeed, according with the author this relation is often 
played within a three-dimensional net composed by: the state, the producer (direct organization in 
charge of providing the services) and the citizen. The successful coordination between these three 
basic nets is what will define a successful process of organizing or not. Coherently, there are at 
least two mechanisms that the state can use to regulate these institutions: on one hand it can be 
normed through ethical codes. On the other, it can allow the market to regulate by giving citizens 
the opportunity to choose (ibid).   
 
Therefore, what the state can do is defined by the state’s capacity to: first, coordinate, direct and 
regulate the political interest; second, to standardize the action repertoires to the ideological 
ambition of the producer institutions in relation to the citizens, and third, to ensure a sufficient 
level of coherence between their services and the objectives of the policy as defined by the design 
(ibid).  
 
3.5.5. Substance of legitimacy  
 
Citizen’s trust in the institutions responsible for implementing public policies is decisive for what 
the state can or cannot do. Rothstein point here is about the relevance of legitimacy, just as it was 
pointed out in previous sections through the concept of rule of law and democracy. The states 
capacity is more than a matter of programs, design, casual theories, or organs of implementation, 
is also a question of the view citizens hold over the existing state (Rothstein, 1998). As 
Fukuyama (2011, 2014) and Rothstein (1998) also recognize democracy as the main avenue to 
legitimacy. Moreover, he proposes that if the discrepancy between policy goals and practical 
measures increases, it can be expected that legitimacy eases. Thus, its relevance to keep sufficient 
room for flexibility to meet the changing or unexpected needs of citizens, which in turn will 
reflect on an increase in the support and legitimacy of public policies (ibid).  
 
3.5.6. Process of legitimacy  
 
Rothstein (1998) identifies six ideal-typical models of what the state can do in order to ensure 
that its policies are implemented in a manner regarded as legitimate:  
 
a. The legal-bureaucratic model: ensures legitimacy through the enforcing of uniform rules 
by which citizens can predict the outcome of their dealings with the state. However the 
limitation is that this model tends to be stiff and dependent on uncorrupt and impartial 
bureaucrats. 
b. The professional model: transfers the implementation power to specialized professionals, 
by doing so the state becomes dependent on the professionals’, and this entails limitation 
on what measures it can take within their group. However, the professionals also become 
dependent on the state to grant them membership and the right to look after the citizens.  
c. The corporatist model: is based on the idea of using representatives to legitimize policies 
and programs targeting the group accountable. For this model to be effective, 
representatives must be elected in a democratic fashion and enjoy confidence of the 
members they represent. Additionally, it can only be applied when such an organization 
exists in the society and when organizations are considered as co-responsible instead of 
antagonists.   
d. The user-oriented model: it grants influence over implementation to direct service users. 
The limitation here is the possibility of conflicting interests among the same group of 
users, or even conflicts with the professional ambitions of the staff. 
e. The politician-oriented model: functions in a similar manner, but instead of direct service, 
users elect local politicians, assuming they have certain civic discernment so the 
participation in decision will be regarded as legitimate. However the risk here is higher, as 
administrative power will be resting on individuals responding also to the political party 
ambitions. Moreover, support by the citizens can also be partial decreasing the level of 
legitimacy of their decisions.   
f. The lottery-based model: solves this problem by selecting individuals through a lottery, 
ensuring legitimacy by a process in which all citizens enjoy the same chance to occupy 
the decision making power. This model can be in fact effective if specific experts are 
difficult to reach or are inaccessible.  
 
3.5.7. Summary 
 
In this last three sections 3.3 – 3.5. I had given an account of the conditions necessary to translate 
the normative components of policies into practice. However, as stated at the beginning of 3.3. an 
approach of this nature also allows a completion of a cycle of change, by which institutional 
arrangement can also enforce change on a normative level.  To examine these conditions I have 
first given a general description of the normative and practical components of implementation. It 
was then argued that in order to explore the conditions by which these institutions are able or 
unable to perform their role is necessary to have a look at the qualities of implementation. In fact, 
although the stateness is key element in providing a sufficient and stable atmosphere for political 
development, it is not the sufficient condition. In line with Fukuyama, the quality of the state is 
essential and Rothstein’s theory arguments for how policies should be framed in order to promote 
a quality of state in the future. Here three main points were presented as principles to analyze 
implementation. The first one, describes two important discourses that need to be combined for 
the analysis: the normative and the empirical discourse. The second, had to do with the 
importance of looking at the rules (institutions) as inflicting effect on what is valued in a society. 
The third, indicated that by identifying principles forming the fundaments of generally accepted 
institutions one could also do an analogous reasoning to generate normative principles in the 
future.  
 
Subsequently, I gave an overview of the two aspects of implementation. In 3.4 the normative 
premises are presented I looked at the principle of neutrality and individual autonomy, by which 
the state has the pressure to balance the provision of equal opportunities with the neutrality 
towards citizen’s choice. Finally in 3.5 I presented six major factors affecting policy 
implementation, organized around two different steps: the substance and the process.   There, it 
was stated that beyond this six categories, the successful implementation of policies are a 
question of flexibility: the capacity that institutions have to accommodate the actions anticipated 
by the policy theory to the changing reality.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 4.Methodology  
 
This chapter briefly describes the research method. I first outline the research approach (3.1) to 
later characterize the research design (3.2), study area (3.3), data collection method (3.4), 
interview process (3.5), analysis process (3.6), ethical considerations (3.7) and limitations (3.8).  
 
4.1. Research Approach  
 
The research initiated when I realized the similarities between discursive principles present in 
Norway and Bolivia. It caught my attention that regardless of their distinctive location and 
history, both had embraced a common political approach: social-democracy. Although the 
discursive elements were similar, practical results seemed very different based on the content of 
news, professional opinions and academic papers. As been familiar with the Bolivian history, a 
major process of change has started with iconic steps such as the approval of a new constitution 
in 2004. As a result, social services and local administrative layers had been faced with the 
challenge or assuming to new responsibilities. Ten years later the operationalization of such is 
still in progress and results are far from being visible. An initial overview of the policies targeting 
children’s wellbeing in both countries showed further similarities on the scope of services. 
However, it also made evident the contrasting results both countries had in this respect, bringing 
to surface the interest to: understand better the conditions associated with these contrasting 
outcomes, but also finding ways in which development could be enhanced in Bolivia.  
 
The complexity of the topic led me to consider different options of narrowing the scope of 
feasible research with concerns to resources, experience and time. It was also evident that the 
difficulty to find a solid theory to analyze both the general but also the practical components in 
each country. Therefore, I decided to combine two theories. Fukuyama’s Theory of Political 
Development and Decay, and Rothstein Theory of Policy Implementation to explore the 
protection and health care services for children under six. These theories were selected as they 
have clear descriptive categories in the form of models, allowing a comparative analysis of the 
contexts. The analytical process followed an inductive orientation, in which the theory did not 
guide the research question and design (Bryman, 2012), but came along after the data collection 
as an element for the organization and interpretation of the data.  
 
There are many comparative studies conducted in the topic of policy transferability but little has 
been done with a scope towards the future, this is the analysis of policy transferability as a tool 
for policy design, policy planning and overall development. In consequence, for this research a 
qualitative approach is suitable as it is the design for excellence to develop theory (Merriam, 
1998; Bryman, 2012). Additionally, a transferability analysis requires the contrast of a 
phenomena along different context. Coherently this research subscribes within a qualitative 
approach with a comparative design.  
 4.2. Study Design  
 
In simple words, a comparative design allows the study of two cases (which may be organization, 
nations, communities, etc) using the same research instrument with the aim of explaining 
similarities and differences, bringing awareness and understanding on a reality in different 
national contexts (Bryman, 2012). Moreover, when a comparative design is applied with a 
qualitative strategy it takes the form of multiple-case study. The advantage is that it helps to 
generate theory within the real-life context (ibid). In this case, in the form of factors for 
transferability, through the analysis of mechanism working in contrasting contexts.  
 
This study centers on the issue of policy transferability between a case where policies for children 
under six are broadly consider effective, the case of Norway, and a context where it is not, the 
case of Bolivia. Therefore in this study Norway is a model that can be used to improve the 
services and provisions arranged in Bolivia for the wellbeing of children during the pre-school 
period. Both countries have similar legislative mandates and have agreed to international 
regulations on the topic (like the United Nations Declaration of the Rights of the Child), however 
their results are dissimilar. The study aim is to provide hints on the conditions behind these 
differences, examining practices that could be transferred in order to achieve better conditions in 
Bolivia. In this respect, the analysis of the implementation of policies is centered to the case of 
Bolivia, to identify the conditions that limit the effective practice of the rights and entitlements 
assumed at a formal legislative level. Norway at this level is used as a model to see the 
conditions, mechanisms and means for an effective practice of the normative principles.  
 
To perform an analysis on transferability, first I look at the conditions behind working intuitions: 
the policy issue. Thus, the objectives of this study are two: 
 
a. Identify the specific characteristics of the policies, institutional body, services and 
benefits available for child under the age of six in Cochabamba-Bolivia and Stavanger-
Norway. 
b. Explore the possibility to use the experience of Norway in the Bolivian setting as a tool to 
improve the child welfare provisions.  
 
4.3. Study Area 
 
The research took place in two different contexts: the Stavanger Kommune in the Region of 
Rogaland, Norway; and the municipality of Cercado (Cochabamba City) or the Department of 
Cochabamba, Bolivia.  According with Statistics Norway (2014), by the last quarter of 2014 
Norway had 5 165 802 inhabitnts, from which Rogaland hosted 466 302, and Stavanger 132 102. 
In regards to Bolivia, the National Institute of Statistics (2011) in last updates in 2011 found that 
from the 10 624 495 inhabitants that the country has, 618 376 lived in Cercado.  
 
In respect to the policy field of interest in this research, three welfare areas were identify for 
children under six: Child protection services, child benefits, and child health services. In this 
research, experts and servants were interviewed in respect to the first and the latest (Child 
protection and health services). In Norway, experts were contacted through their participation 
with the University of Stavanger. In Bolivia, experts and servants were contacted based on their 
academic experience or their experience working in public institutions. 
 
4.4. Data Collection Method 
 
The empirical data for this study was gathered through a main source: semi-structures interviews 
with experts and servants. The interviews for Norway were done face to face. For Bolivia, the 
interviews where done with the cooperation of a surrogate and the support of phone calls. To 
further strengthen the findings, I also used supplementary sources of data to corroborate or clarify 
what was mention by the respondents. These sources were directly pointed out by the interviewed 
party. Questions were conducted to clearly identify these sources so they could be retrieved later. 
In other occasions, these sources were printed and shared by the respondents as to support their 
statements. The secondary sources were abundant and helped to understand what was stated in 
the interviews, however only few were finally used in the analysis.  
 
4.4.1. Specific characteristics of the data collection instrument 
 
Interviews are the most common method to collect empirical data on qualitative research 
(Merriam, 1998; Bryman, 2012). Commonly the asset of interviews is their capacity to provide 
access to information that otherwise cannot be observed such as feelings and perception, getting a 
grasp of what is in someone else’s mind (Patton, 1990; Merriam, 1998). However, in this 
research feelings and personal opinions are threated carefully. The aim of the interviews was to 
access large amount of information through the answer of experts and servants. It was asked to 
the interviewed party to be as objective as possible and to answer based on information that could 
be supported by reliable sources (such as researches, professional experience, or official 
documents). Therefore the nature of the questions was informant factual questions. These 
questions focus on accessing information that is familiar to the respondent, where interviewed 
candidate takes the role of informants rather than respondents answering questions about 
themselves (Bryman, 2012).  
 
Semi-structured interview  
 
There are two types of qualitative interviews depending on their flexibility level: un-structure and 
semi-structure (Bryman, 2012). For this study a semi-structure interview was the most adequate. 
In a semi-structure interview, there are thematic areas that are supposed to be covered as well as 
suggested questions, but the form of the questions and the sequence is subject to adjustments to: 
follow more naturally the discourse of participants and encourage them to answer with certain 
freedom, as well as to allow the interviewer to explore more in-depth certain areas or ask for 
clarifications (Packer, 2010).  Having thematic areas is important for comparative research since 
context needs to be contrasted under the same terms (Bryman, 2012).  
 
A total of seven semi-structure interviews were conducted, three for Norway and four for Bolivia. 
The interview guides were designed following two aims:   
 
a. Identify the policies and institutional conditions behind the services and benefits relevant 
to the field of child welfare.  
b. Characterize and describe the specific services and benefits available in each context in 
regards to Child Protection and Child Health care policies for children under six.   
 
Following this double aim, the first phase of each interview was composed by general open 
questions. Later, to attend the second aim a grid of possible case scenarios was built and used for 
each policy area. Open questions around four thematic areas: Coverage, access, provider and 
quality, were also asked to guide the interview. Since the interviews were conducted in two 
different countries with different languages the guide was first designed and tested in English in a 
pilot interview; and then translated into Spanish. For detailed information about the guides see 
Annex I and Annex II. To ensure that the grids and question were relevant to the aim of the study 
they were also controlled and approved by an experienced supervisor.  
 
Phase II instrument: case-scenario grids  
 
Whereas critics argue that it may be advantageous to have a more open-ended approach in many 
instances, the need for comparison often means that the researcher needs to develop an explicit 
focus having effect on what is considered for the collection of data (Bryman, 2012). To balance 
between flexibility and common categories that can be used to contrast two contexts, the semi-
structured interview was tooled with a grid of possible case scenarios for each policy area (See 
Figure 6). The thematic areas were chosen following the most common categories when 
describing welfare state models (see for example: Esping-Andersen, 1990): Provider, coverage, 
and access. Quality, a fourth dimension was also considered since the mere presence of services 
or benefits may not allow an in-depth understanding of the level of effectiveness. These four 
thematic areas were organized as a continuum between two opposite poles. For each case 
scenario, questions were made eliciting the description of the services rather than a simple 
categorization along these ranges.   
 
Figure 6: Child Welfare Service Areas and Thematic Areas 
 
Provider: Public        Private  
Coverage: Extensive       Minimal 
Access: Universal       Selective 
Quality: High        Low 
 
Source: Self production.  
Child Welfare 
Services 
A. Health care 
B. Child related 
benefits and 
services 
C. Child 
protection 
services 
 It is desirable to conduct a pilot study before administrating structured tools, since piloting has 
the role of ensuring that the research instrument functions well (Bryman, 2012). Although this is 
commonly done for self-administrated instruments such as questionnaires, the grids are also 
structured case scenarios that were built by the researcher. Therefore, to ensure that the 
instrument would help to gather relevant information in regards to the research question and aim, 
it was tested prior to its application to the respondents and adjusted as needed. The grids can be 
seen in Annex I for the English version and Annex II for the Spanish version.  
 
4.4.2. Participants  
 
A total of eight participants were selected. Due to the complexity of the topic, the nature and the 
aim of the interviews, only professionals with experience and expertise in the areas of interest 
were selected. In Norway, interviews were conducted only with experts, whereas for Bolivia both 
experts and field professionals were considered. This was due to the necessity to cross, validate, 
contrast, and complement information in Bolivia, as the opinion of experts and professionals 
could be biased due to their belonging to political parties or pressure from social organizations. In 
consequence, for Norway three experts were interviewed. One with knowledge over the general 
organization of the welfare and political system, and two other experts on child welfare and 
health care services. In Bolivia, two experts: one in child protection services and another in health 
care provisions; and three field professionals: two working with protection services for either the 
municipality or the region; and another middle-range authority of the health care service. 
Although purposive sampling can be containing (Silverman, 2013), this combination between 
academics, low-range professionals, authorities, regional and communal based was important for 
Bolivia as coordination between systems is limited.  
 
The criteria for selecting the experts were their academic experience on the specific area of 
interest. For Bolivia it was important to select only academics that were not involved with the 
public service or political parties. In this country, research is mainly done through NGO’s 
initiatives. Therefore experts were contacted through a net of NGOs that appointed possible 
informants. In Norway, academics were contacted through the university as it is the common 
environment for academic production. To select the servants to be interviewed in Bolivia the 
criteria was at least one:  part of the regional system, part of the community level, middle range 
authority, and low-range servant; and were contacted through colleagues working at the public 
university.  
 
4.4.3. Interview Process 
 
The interviews start with a description of the aim of the study and it’s possible academic and 
practical contribution. I then clarify the nature of the interview and the qualities of information 
that was requested. It was mentioned briefly the importance of their participation and the 
anonymity of their participation.  Then it was allowed for them to comment on their capacity to 
provide reliable relevant information and agreed of not to take part on the study. All interviewees 
confirmed they met the criteria for selection and accepted to participate. Then it was asked if they 
would agree to have the interview recorded with the finality of having an adequate transcript of 
the data (Merriam, 1998). Only one participant denied to be taped. Detailed notes were taken 
instead.     
 
The interviews were conducted in two different countries with different languages. The 
interviews in Norway were a face-to-face dialogue in English. In Bolivia, initially interviews 
were tried to be through skype. However it was difficult for the respondents to meet the dates. 
This was considered in advance as a possibility because of the lack of familiarity to this means of 
communication. Therefore, a surrogate was a better option. She was charged of conducting the 
interviews. Two sessions were arranged prior the interview to inform the surrogate about aim of 
the study and the logic of the questions and case-scenario grids. On the last session, 
comprehension and familiarity with the tool was proven through role playing.  
  
4.5. Analytical Procedures 
 
A qualitative approach emphasizes words rather than quantification when collecting and 
analyzing data, following an inductive process (Bryman, 2012). The general strategy when 
processing the data was grounded theory. After the data collection, transcripts were made 
considering what was said by the experts. Because of the nature of this study, there was a strong 
emphasis on the content rather than the emotional component on their narrative. These transcripts 
were later read in detail. Notes were taken of the overall impression after every single transcript. 
First the three interviews were read for Norway and then the four for Bolivia taking a long pause 
in the middle. It was considered important to analyze the data first in a separate manner avoiding 
preconceptions when reviewing the interviews for Bolivia. Then the transcripts ware reviewed 
again, in this time sentences were highlighted and named descriptively in regards to their contents 
following an open coding strategy. In this way, my interpretation of data shaped the emerging 
codes and not the other way around (Bryman, 2012; pp.568-569).   
 
Secondly, the interviews were read again, the codes that were at time extensive description of the 
contents were named with a thematic tag. Codes then were organized and named under inclusive 
topics. The result was four thematic diagrams: two for Norway and two for Bolivia, one per 
policy area: child protection and heath care services. Then these themes were contrasted per 
country giving a final organization of the themes per country: two thematic diagrams. Interviews 
were read again using these diagrams. Quotes exemplifying the themes were extracted for each 
country. This process of constant comparison helped to maintain a close connection between the 
data and conceptualization (ibid).  Finally, the results were contrasted with the models and the 
theoretical concepts. Although there was a clear idea about the use of the model and concepts to 
facilitate the comparison of Norway and Bolivia, the process of the data was done independently 
to ensure objectivity.  
 
4.6. Ethical Considerations 
 
The first ethical consideration is in regards to the aim of the study itself. Traditionally Denmark’s 
have been used to force countries into following certain pathways of development, sometimes 
against their own interests and needs (s.e. Washington consensus effect in developing countries 
in Theoretical Framework).  To what extent is transferability an asset or a risk? In fact, this 
research study aims to provide some evidence of how transferability can be considered an asset 
for development. This is mainly achieved by keeping the interest and conditions of the recipient 
country in central focus. Transferability in this research is not done through the imposition of 
policies or programs, but rather as ideas. This is important, as it gives room for the recipient 
country to develop practices around those ideas that better fit their context.  
 
The second group of ethical reflections are practical. When dealing with respondents, there are 
several factors that need to be considered to safeguard their participation in the study. Silverman 
(2013) points out five ethical aspects to be consider in this respect: inform consent, 
confidentiality, voluntary participation, avoid harm, and conflict of interests. Respondents were 
provided with information about the scope, method and aim and the research and were asked to 
voluntarily participate. Their anonymity was ensured and tape records were only used after their 
approval.   
 
4.7. Limitations   
 
A set of logistical and practical limitation were present in the study and could had implication on 
the loss of possible relevant data:  
 
- The restricted amount of time and resources: narrowed the scope of the study and the 
amount of interviews. It also made it impossible to conduct the interviews face-to-face in 
person for the case of Bolivia. 
- As a complex topic it was not possible to corroborate and examine documents that could 
have provided a deeper picture.  
- By interviewing experts and servants I had access to large amount of information in a 
very short time, but information was in a way selected by the respondent when answering.  
- The language: In Norway the interviews were done in English, second language to both 
respondents and interviewer. In Bolivia, the interviews were done in Spanish, native 
language to both respondents and interviewer, but interview guides and the later answers 
had to be translated into English. To lower the loss of information to the minimum, the 
analysis of data for Bolivia was done in Spanish and later translated into English.   
- The use of surrogate interviewer in Bolivia.  
 
Additionally, a set of limitations are also attached to the methodological approach of the study:  
 
- Reliability and validity are often considered weak in qualitative studies. However, are 
matters of the quality of the measures rather than the design itself (Bryman, 2012). In this 
case, this risk was lowered by presenting clear descriptions about the procedures of 
selecting respondents, design measures of concepts, research instruments and analysis of 
data.   
- Being a comparative study based on two cases in two specific communities, 
generalization is low. Nevertheless, it is important to consider that generalization in 
qualitative studies can take a different form than the traditional by looking at 
generalizability in regards to structures rather than single social practices (Gobo, 2008)  
-  It has been argued by some scholars that the downside of a comparative multi-case study 
is that the researcher pays less attention to the specific context and more to the ways in 
which the cases can be contrasts (Bryman, 2012). This limitation was lowered by using 
the multiple case scenario grids, this tools allowed to explore in specific the ways policies 
and principles were implemented through specific services. By not only asking about the 
general institutional, political, administrative and organization conditions behind services 
and asking for the characteristics of the services as such, specific context were grasped.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.Analysis I: Institutional Appreciation: 
strength and scope    
 
 
The analysis is divided in two chapters. In Chapter 5, I explore the capacity and scope of the 
states by looking at their functions and their ability to carry on with these functions. This analysis 
provides a clear comparative picture of Bolivia and Norway. Both countries have assumed a 
similar coverage in regards to child welfare – health and protection; however they reached 
contrasting results. As the results show this is directly related to the balance or unbalance 
between scope and strength, and the implementation conditions. In this chapter, Bolivia and 
Norway are described in terms of the state scope-strength. In Chapter 6, I introduce the analysis 
of the implementation conditions as the fundamentals for policy transfer.  
 
Outlining the content, first I present the result in terms of general institutional conditions of 
Child Protection Services and Child Health Care Services in Norway and Bolivia (5.1). The 
scope (5.2) and the state strength (5.3) are presented in terms of the rule of law and democracy. 
Together these steps provide a general overview of the institutional conditions.   
 
5.1. Findings: General Institutional Features  
 
After a review of the interviews with experts and servant in Bolivia and Norway, similar but also 
different categories were identified. These categories are organized in different topic areas and 
provide an overall picture of the general institutional conditions for services. Following, I briefly 
present these categories and the general contents covered by each one of them as a start-up for the 
later comparison of both systems.  
 
Before I introduce the general results, it is important to clarify that I do not present direct 
quotation in this section in order to avoid repetition. The categories and their content serve as the 
building blocks for the overall analysis. Direct support for these categories is presented along the 
rest of the sections providing clear example of the meaning of the categories in regards to the 
analytical tools and concepts.   
 
5.1.1. General Institutional Features: Findings in Norway 
 
Contents of the information gather are organized in four areas:  
 
- Organizational arrangements  
- Legal framework  
- Control mechanisms  
- Services and values  
 
The first area includes three aspects: the administrative levels and roles, the political and 
organizational features and the local autonomy and decentralized services. There are three 
administrative levels: the national, the regional and the community level. The national level is in 
charge of stablishing common targets. The regional and community level both function within the 
parameters of the Child Law, Children Act and UNCRC (United Nations Convention for the 
Right of the Child). However the region responds to the national department and the community 
enjoys certain autonomy. Within the region there is also an independent control organ that 
monitors the services and administration of the Region and Community.  
 
There are two topics in regards to the political and organizational features:  
 
- The general political organization of Norway in three organs: parliament, judicial power 
and executive power to ensure the functionality and reliability of decision making and 
administrative processes.  
- The mixed experts-political composition of administrative levels, bringing democratic 
representation, stability, continuity, and expertise.   
 
In respect to the last organizational feature, local autonomy and decentralized services, the 
manner in which services are provided to the public is described as: accessible to users with 
decentralized services in local units and division in specialized disciplines/tasks; as well as 
flexible and subject to local adjustment. Two features were identified in relation to these 
arrangements: 
 
-  Institutional coordination as a crucial factor for quality. Coordination was described in 
terms of mediation agents and institution, communication of relevant information, and 
coordination rather than merging of services.  
- Adjustment of national programs to the local reality, as dependent of the characteristics of 
the population and the capacity of local institutions to do so.  
 
The second area, legal framework refers to the law behind services and law enforcement 
mechanisms. In Norway, this framework subscribes national and local level to the mandates of 
the Child Law, Child Welfare Act and UNCRC. The law establishes the overruling primacy of 
the children rights. Law bounds professionals in contact with children to report provide a quality 
of service, and collaborate for the welfare of the child. The law is represented at the regional level 
trough the Family Courts and a national level by the Supreme Court, both working in an 
independent manner from other institutions. This is an essential feature that has brought a sense 
of fairness and trust from citizens towards decision makers and the overall system. Nevertheless, 
law is just one ingredient to the formula for effective services. The conditions of the system, 
professionals, and resources are also critical components.  
 
The third thematic area, the control mechanisms identify means to control and connect citizens 
with the services. Control mechanism exists in two different levels:  
 
- For providers: the Control Province is the agency working at a regional level to ensure 
the quality of the services and administration. The control has a sanctioning but also a 
constructive nature, ensuring support to develop the institutions.  
- For citizens: agents and institutions, such as the Public Health Nurse and the Mother-
Child Offices act as agents of surveillance and mediation, connection citizens to services.  
 
Finally, the area of services and values contain the descriptions of how services work within and 
reinforce certain values. Seven values were identified in the discourse of the experts in relation to 
provisions for children under six:  the value of keeping women in the labor market, children come 
first, prevention before attention, keep families together, individual autonomy, and 
equality/integration.   
 
5.1.2. General Institutional Features: Findings in Bolivia 
 
In Bolivia, the same four categorical areas are present. In respect to the first, organizational 
arrangements, four sub-thematic are present: administrative levels and roles, political and 
organization features, autonomy and decentralization, and bureaucracy. Although the first three 
are common to Norway, the content of each section diverges significantly and an additional topic 
is included: bureaucracy.   
 
In relation to the first subtheme, administrative layers are organized in a similar way to Norway, 
in a hierarchical structure from national to local: national ministries, regional governments and 
municipalities. Likewise municipalities enjoy certain autonomy and the responsibility to develop 
national programs and polices into local services. However roles and coordination channels are 
different. The national level prescribes targets and programs that function at local level but 
depend on national head offices. The consequence is a parallelism of services attending similar 
issues but working in little or no coordination.  
 
The regional and municipal levels are under the National Constitution and the Children’s Act and 
UNCRC as it’s in Norway. Both enjoy in theory certain autonomy. In practice autonomy 
becomes difficult since mechanisms and responsibilities are unclear. Similarly, there is a 
supposed control mechanism functioning at a regional level, but in practice the budget for this 
function is insufficient and the monitory reduces to an administrative and financial control. This 
control mechanism is dependent on the regional governance which has implications on its 
reliability.  
 
In regards to the political and organizational features one new topic is added and the contents for 
all are rather different to Norway:  
 
- General political organization of Bolivia is in four organs: parliament, judicial power, 
executive power and national democratic court. The former is a control organ to prevent 
corruption during democratic processes.   
- Composition and selection of administrative levels responds to a mixture between 
designated authorities by political leaders and professionals appointed on personal or 
political interests. Consequently policies and services are constantly changing and are 
effectively and quality wise different from one community to another and from one 
political period to the next.  
- The personnel are regular staff (more stable with long term contracts) or consultants 
(highly mobile).   
 
In respect to the local autonomy and decentralized structure, same as in Norway, services are 
provided to the public through de-concentrated local units. Challenges were identified by the 
respondents: 
 
- Highly disperse communities.  
- Missing channels that connect families and services.  
- Insufficient personnel and resources  
- Decentralization is not encompassed with the necessary coordination 
between services and administrative layers.    
- Autonomy and local based projects: local project to respond to local demands with 
limited continuity beyond different government periods.  
- Autonomy and national programs: National programs respond to their own administrative 
units which makes coordination difficult at local level.  
 
The last organizational feature has to do with bureaucracy and efficiency. Parallel layers and an 
over-complicated administrative organization are factors leading to high levels of bureaucracy. 
Everyday decision making is constrained and overall efficiency of the system is compromised.  
 
In relation to the second area: legal framework, both national and local levels subscribed to the 
same legal framework the Children’s Act recently issued in august 2014. The act attributes the 
legislative and executive power to the national level. For this purpose mechanisms such as the 
Intersectorial Council of Infancy and Adolescence are considered essential but remain as a 
project. The act also recognizes the implementation of policies and provision of services 
concurrent to regions, municipalities and indigenous territories. Moreover, within the framework 
of autonomies regional and municipal level have the responsibility to develop local policies. 
Thus, their decision making authority is considered equivalent to the national level. Still they 
have to respond to targets and programs enforced by national law. However, local policies have 
not been developed yet. Similarly roles of municipality and region in respect to national 
programs in the new framework laws have not been clarified.  
 
In relation to control mechanisms, the Children’s Act stipulates the responsibility of professionals 
working with children to report. However, there are no mechanisms to monitor this.  For social 
servants law only recognizes their accountability if they are regular staff. For consultants and 
short term employees no control mechanism applies. Finally, law is represented at regional level 
by the Regional Family Courts and at national level by the Supreme Family Court, both 
independent from other institutions and overloaded with cases and slow bureaucratic procedures.  
 
In respect to the third thematic area, control mechanisms function on two different levels:  
- For providers carried in three different ways:  
a. Formal control mechanism: embodied within the regional governmental institution 
compromising its reliability. Budget and political disposition is poor, so control 
authorities respond to media pressure. Thus certain social organizations, like the 
association of health professionals, can act in opposition to the control in protection of 
their own interest.  
b. Social action: at times social organizations are also mobilized to advocate. Just 
recently, ministries have used this tool to pressure municipalities. This is related to the 
lack of formal mechanisms of coordination and control after the new law was 
enforced.  
c. Care-giver involvement and control: service users can also act as control agents, 
pressuring but also mediating for the improvement of local units. Caregivers can 
bridge between local services.    
 
- For citizens: the state controls the access of children to their rights through bonuses. By 
law, Child Protection Units and Local Health Services should have a proactive role, 
controlling the well development and wellbeing of the children. However, the precariat 
conditions of these units make this task impossible, as well as the lack of technological 
tools to keep a track on the highly mobile population.  
 
Finally, services work within and reinforced certain values. Four values were identified by 
respondents: regional not individual based redistribution (redistribution takes place by the 
allocation of more resource in the most deprive neighborhoods and areas), protection overrules 
family bonds, attention over prevention, and childhood as a passive uniform experience (adults in 
becoming).  
 
To sum up, a similar organizational structure was identified in both countries; this corresponds to 
the levels of administrative organization, local autonomy, presence of control mechanisms, and 
common legal frameworks covering all administrative levels. However, differences were also 
identified in regards to procedural and implementation practices: administrative conflicts between 
administrative levels, client centric and minimal services, high bureaucracy, limited coordination, 
and lack of professionalism were common to the Bolivian context. In the following sections, I 
will show how these conditions are linked to the capacity of the state to cover the scope of 
services it assumes in the provision of child welfare.   
 
5.2. Scope: The Extent of State’s Functions  
 
5.2.1. Scope of Rule of Law  
 
The scope of rule of law are similar between Norway and Bolivia.  From national to local, all 
levels are subject to the same body of rules aimed to limit authority’s political power (Fukuyama, 
2014). The occurrence of the children rights and the responsibility of the state and the decision 
makers to that respect are common and represented by the National Constitution, Child Care 
Law, Children Act. In both countries this also entitles: 
 
- The national level to enforce certain standards, targets and budgets to which regional and 
community level need to adjust.  
- Responsibility to provide the direct services to the regional and community level. 
- Certain freedom to adjust the services to the population’s necessities and demands.  
 
“By law and constitution the State recognizes the superior nature of the rights of the 
child, the primacy and pre-eminence of the care of children and adolescents; also 
states that the guarantor of the appliance of their rights is the State through public 
institutions […], which implies that the central government is the one with the 
legislative and executive powers […] and at the same time must answer to this 
responsibility. Likewise it recognizes that the implementation of policies and 
provision of services is concurrent with the regions, municipalities and indigenous 
territories” (Expert Health Care Bolivia).  
 
The attribution of responsibilities to different administrative levels bounds the authorities to make 
decisions and arrange services within these limits. Authorities are not free to make decisions 
based on their freewill or personal interest, there are limited by the rule of law (Fukuyama, 2011). 
Law also rules over the citizen’s freewill by ensuring that their interaction happens within certain 
normative premises and is represented at the regional and national level trough the Family and 
Supreme Court respectively. Courts are the institutions in charge of applying the law regulating 
individual-base interaction between citizens, better known as the capacity of states to legislate - 
positive law (Fukuyama, 2011). 
 
In fact, the development of a legislative independent institution was a process in which decision 
making transited from the politicians to a new independent organ.  This is a key feature of 
modern democracies (Fukuyama, 2014) as it controls that the application of law is made by an 
organ independent from the state (Fukuyama, 2011), ensuring transparency in its practice and 
elaboration, and controlling the power of authorities by subjecting them to it.   
 
Referring to the Family Court “This court is independent and that’s very important [--
-] because in Norway the whole system is a sharing between the one who delegates, 
giving the law; and the executive, who administrates; and the judicial power. The 
court is part of the judicial power. [---] before in history there was team of politicians 
deciding that and that was a problem, now is left to the court” (Expert 1 Child 
Protection Norway). 
 
The configuration to this respect in Norway and Bolivia corresponds to the same levels: 
Executive Organ, coordinating and administrating; the Legislative Organ, elaborating law and 
representing the people; and the Judicial Power, enforcing the law and controlling that 
constitution is met (Health Expert Bolivia).  
 
Although the levels are the same, the effectiveness could differ due to two reasons: the scope of 
the law as such or the strength (the conditions of the system, professionals, and resources to apply 
the law) (Fukuyama, 2003). In relation to the scope, Norway and Bolivia have similar conditions. 
Law clearly stipulates role, responsibilities and mechanisms at all levels. However, the quality of 
the description of the role is different. For example, in Norway, law is very specific in terms of 
the active role that professionals have in relation to the wellbeing of the child, to work not only as 
control agents but also in partnership with the users and the services.  
 
“The school law says that if the teacher sees that the child is bitten […] they are to 
report to the child welfare services and that there are to collaborate with the child 
welfare services […]. The same you have in the kinder garden and in laws for nurses 
and hospitals and all kind of different areas concerning a child upbringing. In each of 
their laws they say that you are to work together to help the child” (Expert 2 Child 
Protection Norway). 
 
In Bolivia, what we see is that responsibilities to professionals are new in the legal framework. 
Moreover these attributions are limited to the role of control. For example, back in 2004, the 
Bolivian Children Law there was no responsibility attributed to regular citizens and public 
servants to ensure the wellbeing of the child, unless there was already and abuse of rights, and 
then reporting was an obligation of the maximum authority.  
 
“Article 8th5: [---] the directors of hospital centers or establishments public and 
private health, should warn abandonment, abuse or sexual violence affecting a 
newborn a child or adolescent, they are obliged to report the fact in writing together 
with relevant documents to the closest Child Protection Service” (Bolivian Children 
Law, 2004).  
 
Although some progress has been made through the addition of the New Children Law 
(2014) in a specific reporting responsibility section; the content remains limited to just 
control. Article 175
6
 states that: 
 
 “Everyone has the obligation to report to the Child Protection Service cases of threat 
or violation of the rights [---] The public servants have a duty to report such threats or 
violations, and failure to report is an offense that is punishable” (New Bolivian 
Children Law, 2014).  
 
Nowadays, Bolivia and Norway consider the accountability of regular citizens and public 
servants in their control role. However as we will see in a later section, where the capacity for 
rule of law is explored, the effectiveness on its appliances goes beyond the scope to the 
conditions of the system, organizational features, and  human and economic resources.  
 
5.2.2. Scope of Democracy  
 
The political organization of Norway and Bolivia was described having several similarities. The 
division in powers was a key element for accountability, as it prevented the state from acting on 
its own self-interests (Fukuyama, 2011; 2014). In Bolivia, additional to the executive, legislative 
and judicial power (which are common with Norway), there is the electoral organ since 2004. 
This power is in charge of the democratic process, ensuring that elections are corruption-free.  
 
“In addition to these three Bolivia has the National Electoral Court, it’s a separate 
entity from the three powers, and is in charge of running the elections. Also it has its 
representatives at the local level through the departmental courts [---] this is because 
in Bolivia, because of the history, people do not trust the state, then this measure is to 
support the electoral process so that elected authorities are the result of a process of 
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participation of the civil society. Unfortunately, despite these efforts in every 
election, there have always been complaints even before international agencies” 
(Health Expert Bolivia)  
 
In this sense the scope of democracy in Bolivia is to ensure that law is applying indifferently to 
all citizens and authorities, and that democracy is practice in an adequate representative process. 
However, the need for an electoral organ signals certain deficiency. What we see in Bolivia is 
that the mere presence of the state was not a precondition for the emergence of democracy 
(Fukuyama, 2011). In fact, since democracy came too early, when the state was not ready, 
consequences were negative, taking the form of corruption (Fukuyama, 2014). Thus the necessity 
to include an independent organ that controls democratic processes additional to the parliament, 
which is the traditional mechanism of accountability (ibid).  This also signals a regression in the 
form of power, associated to the insufficient capacity of the state to carry on with the task of 
accountability, a tendency towards political decay.    
 
Norway’s scope of accountability is provided by high levels of participation of regular citizens 
and the independence between the different organs. In Norway, there is a combination between 
political authorities, skilled professionals and regular citizens. What is critical to understand for 
the scope of democracy is that the authorities are qualified and legitimate decision makers, 
bringing a sense of fairness and trust towards the system. Participation of ordinary citizens is 
encouraged, reinforcing the legitimacy and trust on the decisions taken, thus transparency in the 
process is also a key element. For example, when talking about the family court:  
 
“Before in history there was team of politicians deciding [---] now is a team compose 
by a leader and two experts […] you also have something call Layman, there are two 
ordinary people. It has to do with our system we want to also have the regular people 
in the court” (Expert 1 Child Protection Norway). 
 
To sum up, there are mainly two types of accountability: Procedural accountability and 
substantive accountability (Fukuyama, 2014). Bolivia has similar and even stronger provisions 
for ensuring procedural accountability, however their presence results from strong challenges 
giving reasons for additional mechanism of control, thus the scope responds to a failure of the 
state to ensure procedural accountability. Similarly, a mechanism of substantial accountability is 
weak due to the high levels of corruption (this will be explained in more detail in the following 
section). On the other hand, Norway is tooled with better mechanisms of control, such as the 
participation of regular citizens ensuring high levels of both procedural and substantial 
accountability.  
 
 
 
 
 
5.3. Strength: The State’s Capacity  
 
5.3.1. Capacity to enforce Rule of Law 
 
In the previous section, the rule of law was described in terms of its coverage.  However, a large 
scope does not ensure effectiveness. This can only be addressed by looking at the capacity of the 
state to enforce rule of law (Fukuyama, 2011).   
 
Autonomy and rule of law  
 
Autonomy is a critical component in both systems. It allows certain levels of freedom for the 
local level to develop the national disposition into relevant services for the communities. Norway 
and Bolivia have embrace autonomy; however, with contrasting results.  Autonomy and a stiff 
hierarchical administrative order can be counterproductive. What is important to avoid such 
mismatch is flexibility and adequate clear roles. Norway has successfully applied both measures. 
 
“[…] the Parliament will adjust laws that are enforced at national level. Local are 
used as consultation when they are changing the law. [---] At the community level 
[…] they have some freedom but also have some tasks coming from the national level 
[…] they decide how to organize the resources” (Expert 1 Child Protection Norway). 
 
In Norway, the inclusion of the local government in the processes of making new laws to be 
embrace at national level helps to establish parameters that are sufficiently flexible and sensitive 
to the local needs. Additionally, participation and freedom at local level makes policies and 
programs down to earth, benefiting instead of constraining the local services. In Bolivia however, 
what we see is first a disorientation of the functions and responsibilities between national, 
regional and municipal level governmentts, leading to an increase of bureaucratization and the 
ineffective assignation of resources.  
 
“What happens is that health has been municipalized, then at the autonomous 
regional level such as the department government and municipalities, do not 
understood that is their responsibility and end un bureaucratizing the services [---] 
and this is the problem.  Sometimes they are short in the provision of medicines and 
supplies” (Servant Health Bolivia).  
 
Second we see that policies, laws and programs are elaborated at a national level without the real 
participation of the local. By law, participation should be considered, however, it rarely happens. 
In result, satellite programs are basically forced onto the local level with little flexibility and 
adequacy to the needs. Moreover, programs work in a parallel level to the municipalities. They 
are organized in their own Departments having an independent authority from that of the 
municipalities and regions. Coordination becomes difficult having a detrimental impact on the 
effectiveness of the service as such. For example:  
 
“The SAFSI (Family Communitarian Intercultural Health Program) are mobile team 
units. They make the diagnosis of the health risk factors. They do family counseling 
about the risk factors that should control in the family, or formed strategic alliances 
of community organizations that exist in a territory for risk present at community 
level [---]. After that they transfer the files to the local health service or unit. The 
local team is responsible for ensuring that these commitments are met, and that the 
work plan left by SAFSI is applied; that’s where the problem is, SAFSI works in total 
incoordination with the local teams. In fact there are conflicts of interest, […] 
because SAFSI belongs to an independent Department and local teams belong to 
national health networks [---] they also have a substantial difference in salaries, the 
SAFSI units earn more” (Expert Health Bolivia). 
 
In this case, what we see is exactly what Fukuyama describes as the rule of law having a harming 
effect by preventing rulers from doing things they would like to do in the interest of the 
community as a whole (Fukuyama, 2011). The fact that programs such as SAFSI work in parallel 
with little coordination limits the possibility of the local authorities to adjust the service to the 
local needs of: the population and institutions providing the services.  
 
Control mechanisms and the rule of law 
 
The results from the data processing showed two different types of control mechanisms present 
common to both countries. The mechanism to control providers by which authorities and services 
are held accountable of their performance and actions; and control to citizens, the capacity of the 
state to enforce law onto the overall population.   
 
In relation to control for provider, a strong rule of law would be tooled by a legitimate and 
trustworthy institution to control. In Norway, the control at regional and local level is carried on 
by an independent non-political agency in charge of monitoring both the direct services and 
administrative performance of municipalities and region.  
 
“Both levels regional and community follows the Child Care Law. But the regional is 
under the national department that’s the difference; whereas […] there is more 
freedom for the Kommune, is a type of autonomy. At the regional level there is a 
control organ (control province) that assures that the community and the region 
follows the role and mandates from the national level. They control if they are 
following the law. [---] They have also control in the health area as well. […] they 
control not only the institution assessing and making the decisions but the institutions 
of placement and other services” (Expert 1 Child Protection Norway). 
 
The monitoring process is not only aimed to control and sanction inappropriate or ineffective 
practices, but also targets the identification of need and the provision of support to develop the 
institutions.  
 
“Well they can give some assistance, support or amendment, or also a fine; a 
correction. [---] The quality is looked at inside the services, at local in the community 
and at a regional level” (Expert 1 Child Protection Norway). 
 
In Bolivia, control takes the form of formal and non-formal processes. In reference to the first, 
dispositions are to Norway; however this task is embodied within the regional department and 
therefore the level of reliability is lower since often private interests from the political authorities 
interfere.  
 
“Each department is autonomous, so one of the main roles of the SEDES 
(Department’s Health Service) is to track the quality of the services [---].  There are 
norms from the central government of how the services need to be like. There are 
regions that are doing well at following the quality, but not all of them, precisely 
because of the organizations. For instance, if somebody belonging to the associations 
of doctors becomes the director of the SEDES, gives the command not to do the 
control and evaluations” (Servant Health Bolivia).  
 
Moreover, the mechanisms of control have such precarious conditions that their action limits to 
the monitoring of the administrative and financial issue. The accountability of the professionals 
providing the service is rarely looked at. The legal disposition is that only the staff (long-term 
contracted personnel) should be accounted as responsible. Professionals hired under short term 
contracts (consultants) are not hold legally accountable for their actions.  
 
“The control mechanisms are very precarious, […] are done mainly in administrative 
and financial issue but not in relation to job performance. The changing staff is also a 
problem, […] the stuff working as consultants according with law 181 have no 
responsibility over their work and only institutionalized personnel has responsibilities 
of their performance” (Servant 2 Protection Bolivia). 
 
In fact, in Bolivia control often takes the form of non-formal methods, such as social pressure. 
Since the capacity of the state is limited in enforcing the law, citizens represented through social 
organizations or civil mobilizations exert pressure onto authorities and services. For example:  
 
“Only after an infamous situation, a murder or something like that, does the 
authorities start to feel the pressure and act upon it” (Expert Protection Bolivia) 
  
At times the control through social action can lead to forms of mediation by which services are 
improve as users build bridges connecting different providers that otherwise function in an 
isolated manner. For example:    
 
“What we see is that the higher the involvement of parents the better the selection of 
personnel is, the better the service and the overall provision of care to the children. 
As a successful practice we can mention 3 centers (…) that had begun to coordinate 
with the local health service, so the regular health control and vaccines for children 
are provided at the center. They had also coordinated with the SERECI (Civil Court 
Office) so they can register and give birth certificate” (Servant 1 Protection Bolivia) 
 
In relation to the control for the public: Norway has legal dispositions attributing power to the 
institutions that are in direct contact with children to monitor their wellbeing and development. 
By law professional working with children have the duty to advice but also report in case of 
conditions that might be threatening. Moreover, law also requires their involvement in the 
intervention process, acting in partnership with service providers and client.  
 
“Kinder gardens is about if they listen well, if they see well, if there are all over… 
then they say that is something you should have a checkup. They advise and you go. 
Or they can say this to the Child Protection Services, that there is some risk and they 
want them to find out what is happening” (Expert Health Norway).  
 
However as the control at this level is applied by individual professionals, it highly depends on 
their professional discretion. In consequence, the capacity of the state to enforce law in this case 
depends on the quality of professionals working with children. Professional discretion depends 
on factors that are outside the control of the institutions, like employees’ education; but also 
factors within the institutions, like guidance or referential parameters.   
 
“I know that the people in the municipalities they had made some kind of material to 
help for instance kinder garden teacher and doctors, but usually is not regulated [---
]discretion depend on the education, the professionals but also the organization” 
(Expert 2 Child Protection Norway).  
 
However, not all children are in contact with institutions that are responsible of monitoring. 
Therefore to ensure that all children are cared for, other control agents are also available, manly 
servants like General Doctors, Midwifes, Public Health Nurses, School teachers and 
psychologists; or institutions like the Mother-Child Services, that act as the eyes of the state to 
look after the child. These agents function in a pro-active way, actively contacting the family 
with the specialize prioritizing a preventative approach. For example,  
 
 “[…] mostly everybody goes to the public health service […].  If they don’t come, 
then the Public Health Nurse, she will take contact and ask why are not here? And 
then if the mother says I have a private doctor where I go to and it seems ok, then is 
ok. But if the public health nurse is worry because it can be that the mother is 
addicted or something like that… then she can contact the Child Protection Services 
[…]” (Expert Health Norway). 
  
In Bolivia, the capacity of the state to enforce the legal disposition by which citizens, authorities 
and professionals are responsible to denounce cases of abuse is limited. Often they are only done 
after extreme conditions. In contrast to Norway, here the strength of the state to look after the 
child is passive and reduced to minimal levels. Bolivia has developed a different control 
mechanism for only minimal rights (such as the right of health) though the provision of bonuses.   
 
“To encourage public access to these services the current government has 
implemented Juan Azurduy law, is to encourage control during pregnancy where 
women are paid a bonus […] distributed in quotas for each control during pregnancy 
[---]. After delivery for checkups and control of growth and development of the 
newborn up to their six month [---]. And if she has her delivery at a health facility” 
(Expert Health Bolivia).  
 
Paradoxical legal dispositions  
 
In Bolivia, the authorities are selected at regional and local level following a procedure 
recognized by law but that acts against the rule of law. Here, authorities and decision makers are 
appointed in a pyramidal way directly by three elected authorities: the president, regional 
governor and mayor. The president in Bolivia is entitled with the power to appoint its ministries. 
The ministries have also the same right over subrogate layers. Similarly the governor and mayor 
appoint the heads of the different agencies working at the regional and municipal level.  
 
“According to the constitution the president can appoint ministries and from a list 
presented by the minister appoints vice ministers. The minister appoints all directions 
[---]. Now the SEDES (Department’s Health Service)  are appointed by the 
governors. The department directors are appointed by the mayors. The appointed 
responsible of SEDES appoint their head of units and areas and others [---] They 
usually don’t include new people, they rotate between each other” (Servant Health 
Bolivia). 
 
Experience and knowledge are not required, which has damaging effects on the capacity of 
different authorities and servants to decision making. Moreover, authorities can belong to 
different political parties and in consequences conflicts and competition are reproduced at 
different administrative levels.  
 
“There are professional profiles, there are, but when is time to hire they can just 
appoint whoever he wants, sometimes they are good, but sometimes they are not, they 
are not ready, not capable. Like there was this […] because it was time, she was 
enrolled with the party, she didn’t have studies” (Child Protection 2 Servant) 
 
Law and rule of law are two different things and can act in contradictory ways. Building rule of 
law can be challenging as it goes beyond the appliance of legal dispositions. There is no direct 
avenue, not even through democracy (Fukuyama, 2011). In Bolivia, we see a limited capacity of 
the rule of law to control the power of the state. Sometimes law entitles more authority to the 
state, functioning in a paradoxical way against the purpose of rule of law.  
 
5.3.2. Capacity for Democracy 
 
When the scope of democracy was presented, corruption was a strong indicator of the capacity of 
the state to fulfill this task. In the case of Bolivia, a regression in the forms of power is visible 
through four means: the high corruption during electoral process; nepotism when allocating new 
personnel and authorities; corruption of control mechanism; and tokenistic allocation of 
economic resources. This regression signals limitation on the capacity of the state to carry on 
with the task of accountability.  
 
Corruption and control mechanism  
 
Accountability can result from the moral education of authorities, as it could come from formal 
procedures of control (Fukuyama, 2011). This last one is called formal accountability. What is 
critical to understand is that accountability functions on all levels: the authorities, the direct 
service providers (professionals and technical staff), and the citizens. Norway has strong 
mechanisms to ensure accountability on all levels, whereas Bolivia has limited capacity to do so, 
providing minimal control. This is covering only financial and administrative performance of 
institutions and control of entitlement of minimal rights through bonuses.  
 
In fact, in countries where democracy has come too early, before the state is strong enough to 
regulate, the effects can lead to a regression in the forms of power (Fukuyama, 2012). In Bolivia, 
this is visible to a tendency to an extremist sectorial attitude of the population.  The social 
organizations, such as professional associations and syndicates, which are often tools of 
representation, act on a protectionist matter based on partial interests rather than to the overall 
wellbeing of the society, working against principles of justice. In fact, the requirement for 
stability rests on the capacity of a system to discourage desires that conflict with the principles of 
justice, framing the nature of institutions and at the same time encouraging the virtue of justice in 
those who take part in them (Rawls, 1971;  Rothstein, 1998).  Building state means strengthening 
a common goal that can convey different social groups; that can hold authorities, citizens, 
servants and professionals accountable of their actions. Sectorialization can act against this by 
confronting social groups with conflicting interests and by acting in a protectionist manner 
against accountability.   
 
“Overall who is always in opposition to this evaluations are the syndicates, the 
doctors association, the federation of health professionals” (Servant Health Bolivia).  
 
Allocation of new personnel and authorities  
 
In Norway, the organizational arrangement of the different organs and levels respond to a share 
between politicians and employed experts. Head authorities are politicians; however they work 
with a team of experts, also open to the inputs of relevant social groups. The permanence of the 
expert beyond the change of governments is an important feature, as it brings stability, 
continuity, knowledge, experience and skills to the process of decision making and 
implementation of services.     
 
“Is not the politicians that write, is the department. The head of department is 
politician, but the rest are employed. The head changes but the people below stay [---] 
they work together with experts working, that are employed, and that helps because 
they can advise they can know what is possible because they are good professionals 
and they know the system” (Expert 1 Child Protection Norway).  
 
In Bolivia, the conditions are different. Although the composition is also a mix between 
professionals and politicians, some of these authorities are not elected but appointed by an elected 
authority, and professionals are hired under unstandardized procedures, depending on the criteria 
or interest of the authority in turn.  
 
“What is practiced is […] the arbitrary designation of positions [---] in consequence 
we could say that the majority of the people working in this services are not skilled 
professionals, they don’t meet the minimal criteria which is an infringement of the 
rights of the child” (Expert Protection Bolivia)  
 
Moreover, there are two different kinds of personnel: the stable staff with little mobility; and the 
consults hired on short term contracts and highly mobile. Both groups are selected under old 
forms of power (Fukuyama, 2011) regardless the presence of professional profiles.  
 
“The institutional positions are based on a direct invitation and therefore depend on 
political weight. Although is necessary to comply with a profile (item psychologist: 
must be a psychologist) it’s easy for the authorities in power to order in this matter 
without taking into account administrative career or years of experience” (Servant 2 
Protection Bolivia).  
 
This has detrimental effects on the processes of accountability, and brings instability to the 
system and services. It is not only that the quality of the professional is irregular and might not 
meet required criteria, but also that every time there is a change in government there are changes 
on the authorities and therefore the staff. This leads to the interruption of previous policies, 
programs, projects, services, or procedural arrangements, and therefore the provision of only 
minimal services: the attention of cases.   
 
Each time there is a change of director there are also change in the technicians. [---] 
Thus, one of the factors of the poor quality of these services is also the lack of 
permanence of staff, beside the low budget and the lack of departmental policies. 
Each director, especially in the SEDEGES (Office of Social Monitoring), is going to 
initiate new policies. The only thing that continues is the basic attention services like 
shelters and care of cases of violence and abuse.” (Expert Child Protection Bolivia) 
 
5.4. Summary   
 
Norway and Bolivia present similar scope, however they considerably differ on the capacity to 
cover the responsibilities assumed; this is associated to several features that can be organized 
among: 
 
Administrative organization and Bureaucracy 
 
Autonomy, decentralization and administrative layers are concurrent in Norway and Bolivia. 
Autonomy is a critical element in both systems aimed to entitle certain freedom to the local level 
to develop national policies into relevant practices for the communities. To meet this goal, two 
elements are necessary: flexibility and clear roles. Norway successfully meets both. However in 
Bolivia the reproduction of political conflicts at the administrative layers and a paradoxical 
administrative organization leaves to an overall ineffective and inefficient performance in social 
services. In theory, organization arrangements are aimed to ease the process of decision making, 
but in practice lead to the opposite result. Poor coordination; parallel power to national programs; 
discontinuity of policies, programs and servants with change of political authorities; nepotism 
and political-based appointment of authorities and personnel; unclear roles are some of the 
features that signal a weak capacity of the state. 
   
 
 
Control mechanisms  
 
Both control mechanisms for providers and citizens are successfully assumed in Norway. There 
an independent non-political organ monitor and enable resources to resolve challenges at regional 
levels. Where as in Bolivia, this role is embodied within the regional authorities is subject to their 
personal and political agenda. Control of professionals is also different. Professional 
accountability is new to Bolivia and only holds for recurrent staff. In practice, the role of servants 
is just of control and attention of already denounced cases.  
 
To control citizens, Norway has developed agents and institutions that monitor the development 
and wellbeing of the child. Responsibility of reporting and partnering in the resolution of 
challenges is attributed to all the professionals working with children. Thus there is much 
dependency on professional discretion. As such, selection of personal is highly regulated. In 
Bolivia, the role of services is given attention after denounce has been made. Moreover, the 
control of minimal rights is ensured only through bonuses that become available only when 
caregivers attend the minimal monitoring services for the development of children.  
 
Corruption and trust  
 
In Norway, decisions are made in cooperation between political authorities, skilled experts and 
regular citizens, not only mobilizing more resources but also reinforcing transparency and trust. 
In Bolivia, the complex administrative organization and the attribution that authorities have to 
appoint their team, lowers transparency and trust. Thus, in Bolivia there is a regression in the 
forms of power visible through: the corruption during electoral process, nepotism in allocation of 
authorities and staff, corruption in control mechanisms, tokenistic allocation of resources, and 
mistrust and sectorialization.  
 
Economic Resources  
 
Therefore, in Bolivia the assignation of budgets for social development is poor. Moreover the 
allocation is subject to the highly bureaucratized process and the political disposition for projects 
and programs. Regularly budgets are assigned with little control and regardless to the 
sustainability of actions, due to a reactive approach result of social pressure when making 
decisions.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 6. Analysis II: Implementation and Policy 
Transfer 
 
Outlining the content, first I describe the capacity of the state to provide services in both policy 
areas using three models: the preconditions of implementation (6.1), conditions of 
implementation (6.2), and state’s stateness (6.3). The implementation analysis builds on the 
analysis conducted in Analysis I and it serves as fundament to finally point out the features that 
can be transfer from Norway to Bolivia in order to promote political development (6.4).  
 
6.1. Preconditions of Implementation  
 
Health Care Services for Children under six are public and universal. In Both countries, they aim 
to monitor the development of the child before and after birth. In this sense, there are free of 
charge and broad targeting. For example, in Bolivia they describe the service as: 
 
 “Universal for children under five. For the Bolivian State the priority is children 
under five, so all the attention is free of charge. For example we have the program to 
fight malnutrition and starvation in the rural but also the city area. The women get a 
bonus if they bring the baby to the check ups and vaccination […] Bono Juan 
Azurduy” (Servant Health Bolivia) 
 
In both countries, monitoring of development take place as part of the vaccination schemes. 
However, the approach to ensure the access of children to these rights is done in a different 
manner. In Norway, this access is followed by the Public Health Nurse, who keeps a close look at 
the child and provides additional support to parents to ensure a healthy family environment. 
There the service aims to identify possible need at an early stage and connect the user with the 
necessary treatment.  
 
“[…] it also depends on how the growth is [---] is much about when you have a 
vaccination, but is also about development and it depends if the parents are worried 
of the Public Health Nurse is worry about development then they can have extra 
checkups to see if everything goes ok, or if they need to go to a General Practical of if 
they can go to the physiotherapist or an specialist” (Expert Health Norway).  
 
According with Rothstein (1998) broad targeting lowers the stress inflicted onto the organization 
and legitimacy. In Norway, the capacity to monitor and connect users with services shows a very 
developed organization. However in Bolivia, although stress on the organization should be low, 
the weak capacity of the state to provide the services, stress the organization that in turn can only 
promote but not ensure the access of children to their right of a healthy life and development. 
There is no control agent; the access of children to their right health is done through bonuses that 
only become available if care-givers meet the minimal checkups and vaccination.  
 
“The programs of control of development and growth […] are free services […] 
when the child is sick it also has free health care service until he/she is five. […] 
however in practice, is not all the population that has access. The population with 
scarce resources will use these services because they have no other choice. But 
parallel there are also the insurance services for those parents that have formal jobs 
[…] Finally the middle-high economic class [---] have hospitals denominated five 
stars, similar to hotels” (Expert Health Bolivia) 
 
Consequently the universal public services are minimal and considered as the last option. 
Stratification of society becomes visible and is reflected on their access to different providers 
with different quality.  
 
Figure 7. Preconditions for the successful implementation comparative matrix  
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Source: Self production, based on Rothstein, 1998; pp. 114 
 
In respect to the Child Protection Service, this can be cataloged as a dynamic interventionist. In 
both countries, the Child Protection Services is involve in the once there is some level of risk or 
worry and the intervention will depend on the conditions of this situation. In theory, this should 
inflict a higher stress onto the organization and the legitimacy (Rothstein, 1998). Norway shows a 
great capacity to deal with this stress and provide an effective service. Keeping the services close 
to the population through the accountability of professionals working with children to refer 
possible cases, they make a way to work not only in a reactive manner, but also with a promotion 
and preventative approach.  
 
“In all municipalities a kind of system for family to help with family relations so they 
can go there for guidance or supervision or talk about the topic. And in some 
municipalities [---] In every municipality you also have health service for families 
and children […] They can be there for the family as well” (Expert 2 Child Protection 
Norway).  
 However, in Bolivia the case is rather different; the capacity of the state to cope with the stress 
inflicted on the organization is overwhelming. Strong limitations are not only associated to poor 
budgets, but to the overall organizational arrangement. This has been described in previous 
sections:  
 
- The power of servants and authorities to make decisions is not paired with their 
accountability,  
- nepotisms and political assignation of position in the public system reproduces political 
conflict and the instability and discontinuity of policies, programs, services and local 
protection units,  
- the little control is subject to the authorities power 
 
Thus the services that reach the population are minimal and of low quality, far from what is 
attributed as the scope by the children’s Act, National Code and UNCRC. For example: 
 
“Child protection has the duty to attend, intervene and monitor permanently looking 
for any threatening condition that might affect the child […] what we see in practice 
is that the child protection offices are doing a bureaucratic work, very little or no 
supervision or monitoring [---] The technical instances SEDEGES that were the 
responsible for ensuring housing, food, family and all the basic rights […] in this 
bureaucracy have also lost clarity of their tasks” (Protection Expert Bolivia).  
 
6.2. Conditions of Implementation 
 
The strength of the state to carry on with the tasks and responsibilities that it assumes does not 
only depend on the ability to enforce the rule of law and democracy. The strength of the state 
refers also to its capacity to implement policies, projects and programs. The implementation 
conditions depend on the design, the organization and the legitimacy (Rothstein, 1998). The 
outcome of these three steps reveals the capacity of the state to transform the normative aspects 
that inspired the programs and policies into effective practices. Several factors can intervene 
when transforming premises intro practice.  
 
6.2.1. Norway as a model for implementation 
 
To remember: Autonomy in Norway allows municipalities to work in a decentralized manner, 
having services close to the communities and arranged in regards to the prevalent risks and social 
issues. Additionally the local level makes available options and specialized services coordinated 
by public agents and institutions. Coordination mechanisms help to bridge clients and services, 
finding the best fit and combination for the necessity of each client.  
 
The design of policies, programs and services at national and local level is done with the 
cooperation between political authorities and experts; this ensures democratic representation and 
knowledge base practice. By equipping authorities with teams of experts that have knowledge 
and experience, policies and programs are better designed, and enjoy continuity regardless the 
authority in turn. Additionally, the design of policies in Norway is done with the participation of 
relevant social actors, which in turn leads to policies coherent to social necessities.   
 
6.2.2. General conditions of implementation in Bolivia  
 
Autonomy, flexibility and design precision  
 
As in Norway, Bolivia has also assumed local based autonomy and decentralized services 
through small local units. Nevertheless units are often not in the condition to adjust national 
policies and programs, and limit their job to the coverage of minimal functions. This is associated 
to the fact that units are manage as projects, which comes along with constant bureaucratic 
delays, scarce resources, and discontinuity of services.  
 
“The decentralized Child Protection units are managed as projects. These are in 
charge of caring for children and their rights and do preventive work and promotion, 
but practically will reduce their work to the sole provision of attention of cases where 
rights have been violated [---]. These units usually work only between 4-5 months 
because each year they must apply for budget and that involves a very inefficient 
rating process” (Expert Child Protection Bolivia). 
 
Additionally, adjustment of policies is also difficult. National programs answer to their own 
authorities’ independent from local units and with little or no-coordination. For example the 
SAFCI (Family Communitarian Intercultural Health Program), a program that aims to identify 
risk factor for health in different communities, works through mobile units that spend only short 
period of time in each community, functioning in a mechanic homogeneous way regardless of the 
specific conditions of each context and ignoring the resourceful knowledge of local servants. 
Moreover, even national programs are exposed to discontinuity due to the constant change of 
authorities and professionals.   
 
“National policies have also national Directions [---] local teams answer to local and 
national authorities, SAFCI respond to a different independent authority, its own 
Direction […] so as the authorities don’t coordinate, the team also don’t coordinate [-
--] we, people who have experience working in the field with communities know that 
is not enough, even to do a good diagnosis [---] we don’t know where the SAFCI is 
going, it’s been review by new authorities” (Expert Health Bolivia).  
 
Since national policies are hermetic and build at time distant from the real needs, local 
institutions and units often try to develop local projects to answer to local necessities. However, 
these projects are again subject to bureaucratic procedures, limited resources and discontinuity.    
 
“Like the school of parents, we started with one school, now there are many but we 
don’t have the budget nor the conditions [---] In Cercado, Cochabamba and really in 
whole Bolivia violence is a prevalent problem. We have a lot of early parenting […], 
they need support and there was nothing to offer, there were only NGOs and 
Charities working, wasn’t enough” (Expert Protection Bolivia).  
 
Personnel, authorities and expertise  
 
As is Norway, political authorities are supposed to work paired with experts. However in practice 
authorities appoint their direct collaborators regardless of what is stipulated in the professional 
profiles. In consequence, policies are design with little expertise and reality-based knowledge. 
They are limited to provide basic services. For example:   
 
“There is a total disorientation in regards to this issue from the institutions and 
authorities, [---]. In Bolivia a program for children under 5 years cannot be ignore the 
diversity […]. Then there is a strong difficulty to see in a holistic way” (Expert 
Protection Bolivia).  
 
Consequently in contrast to Norway, the qualities of the authorities what defines better of worst 
outcomes. Regions where authorities have experience, knowledge and commitment reach better 
results. Instead of experts guiding political authorities as in Norway here we see a dependence on 
authority’s discretion.  
 
“It calls a lot of attention that regional authorities, and some municipalities showed 
better improvements and overall preoccupation for topics related to childhood […] 
there we found some authorities with a strong commitment […] able to guide the 
social operators.” (Expert Protection Bolivia)  
 
To sum up:  
 
In Bolivia, the capacity to adjust national disposition to local necessities is different to the one 
present in Norway. This has to do with: the limited economic and personnel resources, the lack of 
flexibility in national policies and programs attending in a mechanic manner, the little or null 
coordination and cooperation between national policies and local units, the design of policies in a 
vacuum from the context, and the dependency of authority’s discretion. In consequence, small 
units try to compensate the holes left by both national programs and attentions services through 
local projects. The results are again limited, as projects are subject to bureaucracy, limited 
resources and discontinuity.  
 
6.2.3. Comparative implementation analysis  
 
Rothstein (1998) proposes a model with six components to examine the extent to which 
normative expectation can be effectively translated into actions. A green light in each of the six 
boxes will ensure that the implementation of a program corresponds and fulfils the objectives that 
motivated its creation.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8. Comparative Chart Norway-Bolivia Policy Implementation 
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a. Substance of policy design 
 
Knowledge is not the only fundamental cause by which the design can fail. The real applicability 
of a design also depends on ethical, political, legal and economic conditions (ibid).  Norway 
successfully meets all this criteria. The accountability of professionals, the existence of relevant 
legal framework and sufficient mechanism to ensure its appliance, as well as a strong investment 
in social development had been described in previous sections.  
 
In Bolivia, shortcomings in the appliance of legal and normative disposition, due to corruption 
and the unlimited power of authorities, the high levels of inefficacy associated to complicated 
bureaucratic procedures and little coordination, and scarce budgets were also described. 
Additionally programs can have a faulty design when are purely symbolic or demand driven 
(Rothstein, 1998). In Bolivia this is often the case:   
 
“Only after an infamous situation, a murder or something like that is that the 
authorities start to feel the pressure and act upon it” (Expert Protection Bolivia) 
 
b. Process of policy design  
 
What is relevant is also the coherence and clarity achieved in the design related to the skills of 
those carrying on with the duty of designing (Rothstein, 1998). This has also been described 
previously. For Norway the combination of skilled experts with political authorities brought 
stability, continuity and knowledge to the process of policy design. For Bolivia conflicts between 
authorities and highly politicized decision makers limit the process of design. In fact, political 
conflicts can negatively impact the design outcome (Rothstein, 1998).  
 
Additionally new organizational arrangements in Bolivia detriment the possibility of a good 
policy design. For example, with the unification of diverse social sectors into the vice-ministry of 
equality decision making was constrained and overwhelming responsibilities were attributed to a 
single institution. Scopes of different necessities become less visible, critical factor for an 
effective design.  
 
“The Vice Ministry of Equal Opportunity, is not what was formerly the Vice Ministry 
of Childhood, Youth and Elderly, [...] were instances could have quick access to 
decision making […]. It has become the bag of the secluded sectors […] children and 
youth [---], elderly, disabled, and women. One cannot imagine a vice ministry 
capable of addressing these issues and these very challenging social groups [...] the 
childhood as a social issue becomes completely invisible” (Expert Protection 
Bolivia).    
 
c. Substance of Organizing  
 
Norway and Bolivia are administratively organized in a similar way.  However, their results are 
different.  The main difference is on the arrangements related to clear roles, formal organizational 
standards and procedures, support (both in terms technical and economic), and coordination 
channels.  
 
In Bolivia, we see that the ministries are the national administrative level in charge of elaborating 
policies. But municipalities and regions are entitled with certain autonomy to develop the general 
programs and policies into relevant services for the communities. This entitlement is not 
encompassed with clear role, support and coordination channels, this organizational arrangement 
is not allowing the needed flexibility, leading to a mismatch between structure and organization 
(Rothstein, 1998). For example: 
 
 “What happens is that health has been municipalized, then at the autonomous 
regional level such as the department government and municipalities, do not 
understood that is their responsibility” (Servant Health Bolivia).  
 
In consequence, decisions on how to use the resources are not made coherently to the operative 
necessities and neither long term vision.  
 
“There is a lack of staff, lack of resources […] services are not effective, the police is 
often short in gas for their vehicles but also paper to print reports. Municipalities like 
the regional government allocate their budgets to infrastructure and not to social 
ends” (Servant 2 Protection Bolivia) 
 
Coherence between the objectives and organization can also be limited because of the nature of 
the organization as such. The embodiment of control mechanisms within the organization that are 
ruled by political authorities limit the objective of control as such, since authorities in Bolivia 
tend to respond to private or political interests. For example, SEDES is the regional agency in 
charge of administrating but also monitoring the performance of municipalities in regards to 
health policies. However, the performance of the control depends on the very same political 
authorities or servants that the control is aimed to asses.  
 
“One of the main roles of the SEDES is to track the quality of the services provided 
by the health insurance, private services [---]. There are regions that are doing well at 
following the quality, but not all of them, precisely because of the organizations. For 
instance, if somebody belonging to the associations of doctors becomes the director 
of the SEDES, gives the command not to do the control and evaluations” (Servant 
Health Bolivia).  
 
d. Process of organizing 
 
Although Bolivia and Norway share the same administrative layers, Bolivia has arrange the 
different ministries and department in a more complex net, characterize by high levels of 
bureaucracy narrowing the capacity of decision making at the local level. Thus accountability 
becomes also more difficult, responsibility drift (Rothstein, 1998).  
 
e. Substance of legitimacy  
 
Policy’s political legitimacy has a direct impact on the capacity of the state to carry out with 
programs successfully (Rothstein, 1998). Citizen’s trust in the institutions responsible for 
implementing public policies is decisive. In fact, in Bolivia the quality and the inadequacy to 
local demand creates a relation of mistrust between from the citizens to the system. The states 
capacity is more than a matter of programs, design, casual theories, or organs of implementation, 
is also a question of the view citizens hold over the existing state (Rothstein, 1998).  
 
“One of the most difficult issues for the access of the population to the services is on 
one hand the quality. Generally in Cochabamba there is large amount of population 
that speaks quechua […] This is the first barrier. Then we have the barrier of the 
paradigm that the population has in respect to health problems in discrepancy to the 
academic vision […]. The last barrier, […] perception of the low quality and the 
abuse that exists within the public services. Population in general really appreciates 
more alternative services [---] like the charity, university hospitals and NGOs” 
(Health Expert Bolivia) 
 
The lack of flexibility to adjust to local characteristics, such as the language barrier, shows a 
discrepancy between policy goals and practical measures which in turn can be expected to ease 
the legitimacy (Rothstein, 1998).  
 
f. Process of legitimacy  
 
Rothstein (1998) identifies six ideal-typical models of what the state can do in order to ensure 
that its policies are implemented in a manner regarded as legitimate. Bolivia and Norway have 
arranged different means to do so. Norway uses a combination between a legal-bureaucratic, 
professional and corporatist model. In this way, combines predictability, competent professionals, 
and legitimation through citizens participation in decision making.   
 
In Bolivia, the model corresponds to a politician-oriented model by which elected politician act 
as agents for legitimacy (Rothstein, 1998). The shortcoming is that elected authorities are only at 
high ranks (President, mayor, regional governor, national deputies) the decision makers at 
implementation level are not democratically elected. They are appointed by the politicians based 
on private or political criteria. Therefore the authorities in charge of implementation are neither 
elected nor expertise on the area. This results in high levels of corruption and ineffectiveness.  
 
 
6.3. State’s Stateness  
 
According to Fukuyama (2014), political development takes place when systems successfully 
master their environmental demands through the balanced coexistence of three institutions: the 
state, the rule of law, and democracy. Norway is effective in ensuring, which in turn leads to 
political development: economic growth and social justice (ibid). Norway’s capacity of carrying 
with the scope of responsibilities assumed. As showed in previous sections this has to do with:  
 
- Legitimizing procedures and direct participation of relevant social actors when designing 
new policies.  
- Combination of political authorities with experts, bringing continuity but also knowledge 
when designing, and applying policies.  
- Reliable independent control mechanism regulating the action of citizens and the power 
of decision makers (taking the form of accountability).  
- Autonomy combined with coordination channels through institutions or agents 
communicating users with services.  
- Flexibility at local level and knowledgeable decision makers which in turn lowered the 
stress applied on the organization and legitimation process of implementation.  
 
On the other hand, Bolivia embraces similar principles and values to those in Norway, such as the 
ones stipulated in the major legislative bodies like the constitution, children’s Law and UNCRC. 
However in Bolivia: 
 
- Similarly autonomy is attribute to local level but not encompassed with sufficient 
coordination channels, leading to: 
- High levels of bureaucracy 
- Corruption in the allocation of resources and personnel, thus 
- Rule of law has not sufficient capacity to limit the power of political authorities.  
- The representation of political authorities and experts as decision makers is uneven. 
Professional profiles exist; still selection depends on the appointed authorities discretion.  
 
In fact, unbalance between the state, rule of law and democracy pushed towards a state of less 
institutionalism, turning back to more traditional forms of power (Fukuyama 2011). In turn 
implementation capacity is lowered, reducing the practice to minimal attentions services. 
Implementation conditions are not sufficient failing at all levels: design, organization and 
legitimacy.  
 
The unbalance of institutions and veto power 
 
Moreover, conditions of decay not only result in favor of the state authoritative power; things can 
become unbalanced in either direction. In Bolivia, insufficient checks on state power comes along 
with an excessive veto power on different social groups (Fukuyama, 2014). This is the result of 
the arrival of democracy before state was capable of enforcing the rule of law. For example,  
 
“After these Directions is the technical staff, [---] is called institutionalized staff; it’s 
a staff that can hardly be change […]. They cannot move them because of the 
syndicated of health workers. It’s a strong syndicate that has taken authorities out” 
(Expert Health Bolivia) 
 
State building and sectorialization 
 
Syndicates where democratic measures were first born to protect the rights of excluded sectors. 
During the 70’s, democracy was regain after a long period of authoritarian regimes. Syndicates of 
works played a critical role in constraining the dictator’s power. However, in time the weakening 
of the state, corruption and mistrust continued, thus syndicates became stronger, protecting 
workers interest, even against the general citizen’s wellbeing. (Iriarte, 2004).  In consequence, the 
conciliation and cooperation capacity, and the legitimacy of broader actions demises as society is 
likely to be sectorized (Fukuyama, 2011).  
 
State building is essential in promoting economic growth and social justice, for which is 
necessary that people cooperate beyond their individual interests (Fukuyama, 2004). However, if 
the state is weak then we can see opposite results were power is used by person to respond to 
individual or sectorial interests. In Bolivia, authorities and social organization do so. A clear 
example is the way personnel are selected. It was clearly described in previous sections that in 
Norway experts comply with a professional profile when selecting staff. On the other hand in 
Bolivia, the power that authorities enjoy to appoint their staff and technicians has negative impact 
on the legitimacy.  
 
State building and trust  
 
Legitimacy as such is related to the level of trust that citizens hold towards their governmental 
institutions. No matter how well designed or well-organized a policy is, its implementation is at 
high risk of failure if does not enjoy the confidence of the citizens (Rothstein, 1998). In Bolivia, 
citizens largely mistrust the services and decision makers. On the contrary in Norway people trust 
in institutions. For example:  
 
“The parents themselves […] go and talk to the family services and as well the health 
nurse […] doesn’t  need to be serious to go there […] they can talk to her about 
anything, they trust her”. (Expert 2 Protection Norway) 
 
What we see in Bolivia is that if the state fails to provide then other resources as NGOs are 
mobilized. In many occasions, even serving as technical support to the public services and the 
state, signaling a state in need of development. Trust from the citizens to the state is lower as 
rights entitlement is not criticized in practice.  
 
“For example SOS villages are assisting the Cercado municipality to implement a 
program to prevent risk situations in families […] the people they really much better 
appreciate the work of the NGOs” (Servant 1 Protection Bolivia)  
 
 
 
 
 
Strengthing or weakening states power 
 
In fact, weak states like Bolivia are still in the necessity of state building, whereas strong states 
like Norway constantly push towards weakening state’s power (Fukuyama, 2004). In Norway the 
tendency is to limit authority’s power by: 
 
- Amplifying legitimizing process through the direct participation of social actors and 
strong control mechanism.  
- Democracy, by returning the power of electing representatives to citizens.  
- Offering a relative open market where citizens have the freedom to use either public or 
private services, both cover in its major share by the welfare state.  For example in the 
health service, parents have the right to choose between the private and the public:   
 
“They can go to the general practical, or a private doctor. The child has the right for 
this services but the family can chose where they can have the service. But mostly 
everybody goes to the public service is very few that doesn’t go there” (Expert Health 
Norway) 
 
In Bolivia, similar mechanisms are consider by law, but had serious difficulties when they 
operationalized. The capacity of the state to successfully perform the task that it assumes is 
limited by:  
 
- Low political disposition and accountability of decision makers 
- Little transparency and control mechanism: corruption.  
- Democracy process only for major authorities that are later entitle with power to appoint 
decision makers responsible for design, operationalize and implement policies.  
- Insufficient resources for social programs and services 
 
“The norm when assigning responsibilities to different elements points out at aspects 
that otherwise are just part of a discourse. Like the Children’s Act that stipulates the 
overrule of the rights of the child […] well now the problem is that when to a real 
political predisposition to attain this matter, that predisposition does not exist. So 
without this political disposition assignation of recourses are also unreal. We insist 
that in the children’s act it should be appointed a percentage of how much should be 
assigned. […] moreover it urge us that even the small sums that are assign are subject 
to corruption [---] so no matter if we have the Acts and laws, the old or the new one, 
where is even stated the creation of the children’s council, institution in charge of 
monitoring and operationalizing. If there are not resources, no political 
predisposition, then we will always have a weak institution, if not incapable” (Expert 
Protection Bolivia) 
 
This shows that in the practice, the rule of law and democracy can exist, but if the state is not 
strong, then this institution will remain at a discursive level, state will be incapable of assuming 
its responsibilities. Moreover, the pressure is to include more normative premises on these legal 
buddies, as a tool to limit the power of the state. In practice, implementation of new laws and 
mechanism of control are often delayed by bureaucratic procedures. The inclusion of new 
regulation is an important but not sufficient step if state is not strengthened in its capacity to 
enforce the rule of law and democracy.   
 
For all that was described I can then locate both countries in the stateness matrix as follow: 
 
Figure 9. Stateness and efficiency matrix: State’s scope and strength 
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      BOLIVIA  
    Quadrat III   Quadrat IV 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Self production based on: Fukuyama, 2004; pp. 14 
 
 
Stateness: Norway 
 
Norway provides extensive coverage with strong institutional effectiveness (Quadrat II). It is 
expected that in relation to the double aim of stateness that social provisions will grow but 
economic success will decrease. However Norway prevents the decrease of the economic growth 
by promoting large labor participation with a high taxation scheme. This in turn promoted high 
levels of redistribution through the economic provision of social welfare services.  
 
Stateness: Bolivia 
 
Bolivia on the other hand, locates somewhere in between quadrat III and IV. At times state takes  
little responsibilities, like direct economic support or assistance in case of incapacity; whereas in 
some other cases assumes a middle range responsibility like those in direct relation to protection 
services and health care for children. In any case, the strength of the state is low, having in 
consequence the provision of less than the minimal standards in some respects and the incapacity 
to assume the responsibilities stipulated by law. In turn, both stateness aims are at risk:  low 
social justice and poor economic growth.   
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6.4. Features for transferability 
 
Political development takes place in an environment where the scope and the strength of the state 
are coherent. The key elements to achieve such conditions are the combination of a strong state, 
subject to the rule of law and democracy. The general institutional conditions of these elements 
have a direct impact on the capacity of the state to adequately implement its policies. This 
research showed how policies revile the scope of the state, whereas the strength is visible through 
the implementation effectiveness.  
 
In previous sections Norway was characterizes as having common policies with Bolivia; however 
the mechanism in Norway were more effective when implementation was carried on. This section 
will point out the features of the implementation conditions that could help Bolivia achieve a 
better performance when translating normative premises into practice.  
 
6.4.1. Policy transfer for lowering corruption and the development of 
control mechanism and trust: 
 
a. Municipalities and regions enjoy of certain level of freedom, however they must answer 
to national targets to ensure that conditions for social justice and equality are met. In this 
concern adequate mechanism of control are necessary. Norway has independent regional 
agencies monitoring the performance of administrative and practical instances. By law, in 
Bolivia this agency depends and is embodied within the regional government. This has 
contributed to corruption. Having control agencies as independent organs is then an 
element that could be transferable as it has proved to be more effective.  
 
b. In regards to the professional accountability of servants and authorities. Discretion 
capacity depends on the education, but also on the organizations features. In Norway there 
are the mechanism that hold professionals accountable for their actions, moreover when 
selecting personnel, professional profiles are used to ensure that staff meets the necessary 
skill and experience. Bolivia is very weak in this aspect. Accountability here could be 
reinforced by transferring the idea that accountability needs to be applied indistinctively 
to consultants and staff.  
 
c. In Bolivia, the overruling power of authorities in regards to their right to appoint staff and 
direct collaborators leads to poor practical outcomes. Although professional profiles do 
exist, policies in regards to the control of these procedures need to be developed. The 
elected authorities are only three: president, regional governor and mayor. The heads of 
the different services are appointed by these authorities. In Norway, heads of offices and 
servants are elected on democratic grounds or hired following standardized procedures. 
These administrative arrangements could be transferred as they have proved to be more 
efficient in avoiding corruption, and smoothing processed of design, decision making and 
coordination.  
 
d. As a universal system, with extensive coverage, the Norwegian state has assumed the 
largest share of the responsibility of securing the welfare of its citizens.  For this purpose 
the system has develop different mechanism working on the behalf of the state to control 
and connect citizens with the services.  In Bolivia often the citizens are unnoticed of the 
services available; neither there are surveille on their duty to ensure the overruling welfare 
of the child as its stipulated by national law and international agreements (UNCRC). 
Moreover, the promotion of services is often done by bonuses and only ensure the 
minimal coverage of rights. This is associated to a passive culture in regards to the rights 
of the Child. 
 
“Another feature is also the passivity of the overall population. They don’t take action 
on their own health care” (Servant Health Bolivia). 
 
In Norway, agents such as the Public Health Nurse, Mother-Child Units and the General Doctor 
are pro-active elements that not only monitoring but also connecting the population with the 
services. These agents are a feature that could be transfer from Norway to Bolivia, helping to 
mobilize the institution from an attendance approach to a proactive-preventative scope, which is 
in fact recognizes as the principle by law.   
 
e. Rule of law and accountability has not sufficient capacity to limit the power of political 
authorities. Not because of the lack or norms but because of a weak state, what can be 
done then to strengthen the state? One of the aspects is transparency. In Norway the free 
access of information and participation of citizens in the design of policies are ideas that 
could be transfer and help to develop transparency. In Norway one can go on a data base 
and see who kind of social servant has reported and what (Protection1 Expert Norway), 
surveillance on the effectiveness of the system is simple. However in Bolivia, citizens 
depend on the media covering the cases, thus surveillance is subjective to what is 
informed either though the media or social organizations (subject of political interest).  
 
6.4.2. Policy transfer for the development of a functional administrative 
organization with lower bureaucracy    
 
a. In Bolivia, coordination between different instances is constrained by the parallelism of 
authorities. The lack of coordination has been answered by citizen initiatives that largely 
depend on the contexts. There is a need for stable bridges between services, so access is 
universal. Norway has clear coordination channels represented by the control agents as 
well. The relevance of the control agents is not only to surveille citizens, but also to 
connect the different services to the needs of singular individuals.  
 
b. Another feature is the independence of programs in regards to the community units and 
authorities in Bolivia. This arrangement method created gaps between programs and local 
services, lowering the possibility for cooperation. In Norway, national programs and 
policies are carried on and respond to local authorities. This way adjustment and holistic 
attention is promoted. This is a feature that could also be transferred, as it answers to the 
same principle, that of autonomy and decentralization as a tool for cultural and necessity 
sensitive community services.  
 
c. In Bolivia, there is a prevalent appreciation of the childhood as a stage of little relevance 
and understanding. The constitution and legislative bodies just recently recognized the 
importance of the first years
7
. However organization arrangements show contradiction to 
this new vision. For instance the unification of in a single ministry (the ministry of 
equality). There is the need to highlight the matter of childhood.  
 
Although there is the need for further policy development, this does not ensure the modification 
in the normative component; this is the general appreciation of childhood. Therefore, another 
road is the change of these values through the practice (Rothstein, 1998). In Norway, there are 
specific institutions and services working with children, these institutions are the first to embrace 
and transmit a vision of childhood different from that of complete dependency and an adult in 
becoming. Then a factor that can be transferred this way of working, from the services to the 
norms.  
 
6.4.3. Policy transfer to ensure better resources  
 
In Bolivia, for child protection services local units are managed as projects. The limitation of 
managing the decentralized protection units as projects is the discontinuity and lack of resources 
that this carries on the service available for users.  
 
“An evaluation of the legislative organ to the child protection services showed that 
around 10% o all Child Protection Offices were covering their functions. The 
remaining 90% were not.[---] one of the most important factor that was identify was 
that the units were not working year around and that the teams were incomplete ” 
(Expert Protection Bolivia)  
 
In Norway, units are well establish offices that work year around. In consequence, there are 
subject to the control mechanisms but also avoid bureaucratic procedures, thus ensure more 
stable resources and a continuing provision of service.   
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7.Conclusions  
 
In the spirit of positive and negative reviews by international organisms in regards to the process 
of change in Bolivia, I evaluated two policy areas related to the early childhood as a sample to 
understand the challenges faced by Bolivia – the policy issue.  In addition, to compare this 
challenge with the positive practices and ideas that could be transferred from a model, Norway, 
which has proven to be highly effective in achieving political development. This research 
mobilizes policy transfer in an innovative way by focusing its scope to policy design and policy 
development, similar to international mechanism such as the OMC.  
 
Bolivia and Norway are similar in many aspects, but still very different. In theory, both social-
democratic countries discursively assume the most responsibility onto the state in securing the 
wellbeing of the child. Both had signed the United Nation Declaration of the Right of the Child 
and thus had assumed the responsibility to look after the wellbeing of children as one of their 
main roles. However, the results are rather different. In practice, Norway is the leading role 
model of political development with outstanding results in both economic growth and social 
justice. Whereas Bolivia, a welfare-state in the making, is currently dealing with the ordeals of a 
new constitution. This thesis revels that this is associated not only to the cultural, historical and 
economic differences, but also to the resulting weakness of the state (Fukuyama, 2004; 2011; 
2014). The unbalance between the three basic institutions: rule of law, democracy and state; 
negatively impacts the capacity of the state to implement the policies and programs. 
 
7.1. Scope and strength  
 
National Constitution and Children’s Acts are the normative premises that attribute 
responsibilities to the national level to design and enforce standardized targets and policies, and 
to the local level to provide services and develop this national disposition into relevant practice. 
These normative premises limit in theory the power of the decision makers by attributing clear 
roles and objectives, and at the same time regulate citizens’ interaction by setting rights. 
Although these normative premises are in overall similar between Norway and Bolivia, they 
differ in the specificity and clarity of the roles. Nevertheless, the bridge is not the content, but 
rather the capacity of the states to build a coherent organization that can operationalize these 
premises into practices.  
 
The capacity to translate national policies into local relevant practices depends on the flexibility 
and clarity of the roles of different agents and institutions: such as the responsibilities of 
municipalities, local units, regional offices, etc. In Bolivia flexibility is constrain by a highly 
bureaucratized, politically conflictive administrative organization and dynamic.   
 
The roles are also unclear. Although responsibilities are clearly stipulated in paper, the state does 
not account for links necessary to translate these roles intro clear practices. In Bolivia, there is a 
state of disorientation on the different administrative levels and national programs, mostly after 
the wave of normative changes started by the new constitution back in 2004.  
 By law control it is also one of the main responsibilities of the state, this is to monitor at two 
levels: providers and citizens. In practice, the state in Bolivia has little capacity to perform both 
types of control. Here we see how the law can entitle power to the political authorities to the 
point it functions in a paradoxical way against the purpose of the rule of law as an institution. The 
regression in the forms of power lead to an atmosphere of corruption and mistrust. 
Sectorialization is reinforced, and private and political interest interfere with the decision 
authorities make. This in turn signals the low capacity of the state to ensure accountability at both 
levels. Norway on the other hand has solved this by: organizing independent non-political 
regional control agents for providers and clear control agents for citizens.  
 
7.2. The contribution of the models 
 
Implementation conditions were explored through two models, one assessing the preconditions 
and another assessing the conditions in terms of the design, the organization and the legitimacy 
during the implementation.  
 
The first model was useful to situate Child Protection and Health Care policy areas. Bolivia 
shows challenging conditions whether stress was lower or higher onto the organization capacity 
during implementation. Bolivia signaled difficulties when meeting an adequate organization that 
can make services accessible to the children. There minimal control mediums, like the provision 
of bonuses, promote not even ensure, the provision of only basic rights. On the other hand, 
Norway proved to have sufficient mechanisms to support the implementation of policies. 
Effectiveness had to do again with keeping the services close to the population, this was done 
though control and mediating agents such as the Public Health Nurse that connected users with 
the adequate services; and the attribution to professional working with children the responsibility 
to report and assist in the intervention of challenges.  
 
The model of conditions of implementation, serve to contrast the challenges that Bolivia present 
in all the different stages of policy implementation.  There it was identified that: 
 
- In relation to the design:  shortcomings could be expected as result of the corruption, 
political conflicts, high bureaucratic procedures, little coordination, and scarce budgets. 
Moreover programs were found also subject of faulty design due to its symbolic or 
demand driven motivation for creation.  
- In relation to the organization: organizational arrangement did not allow flexibility, 
leading to a mismatch between structure and organization. In consequence decisions on 
how to use the resources are not made coherently to the operative necessities  
- In relation to the legitimacy: in Bolivia the quality and the inadequacy to local demands 
creates a relation of mistrust from the citizens to the system. Moreover, the lack of 
flexibility to adjust to local characteristics, showed a discrepancy between policy goals 
and practical measures which in turn can be expected to ease the legitimacy (Rothstein, 
1998).  
 
7.3. Level of Stateness  
 
Norway was situated in Quadrat II, thus described as a state that provides extensive coverage 
with strong institutional effectiveness. Bolivia on the other hand locates somewhere in between 
quadrat III and IV. At times state takes  little responsibilities, like no direct economic support or 
assistance in case of incapacity; whereas in some other assumes a middle range responsibilities 
like those in direct relation to protection services and health care for children. No matter what, 
the strength of the state is low, having in consequence the provision of less than the minimal 
standards in some respects and the incapacity to assume the responsibilities stipulated by law and 
international agreements (UNCRC). In turn both stateness aims are at risk:  low social justice and 
poor economic growth.   
 
7.4. For policy transfer 
 
So how has this thesis contributed to improve the conditions of Bolivia? In this research I 
departure from an analysis of the general institutional conditions to land on the implementation 
capacity of the state. This structural-to-practical analysis helped me repeatedly identified the 
features that helped Norway achieve a better performance. Not only challenges were visible, but 
possible resources in the form of ideas were search for within the model – Norway.  
 
However, this is only a theoretical attempt for policy transfer. As other mechanism such as the 
OMC, much is left to the state in the process of assimilating and traducing the recommendation 
into practice. Again this is subject to the same features that were described along this dissertation, 
the stateness of the state. If transferability is possible in practice is a question that remains to be 
considered in new enterprises. Here I was able only to conduct an analysis that proved in abstract 
way how can policy transfer be a tool for political development.   
 
I identified key features that make implementation conditions better and help build capacity on 
the state to perform its task. I organize these features along three critical challenges faced by the 
Bolivian welfare system: corruption, weak control mechanism and low trust; beurocracy and 
administrative inefficiency; and insufficient economic resources.  
 
Policy transfer for lowering corruption and the development of control mechanism and trust: 
 
f. Monitoring agency in Bolivia is embodies within the regional government, been subject 
to corruption. Having an independent non-political control agency is an element that 
could be transferable.  
g. Accountability needs to be applied indistinctively to consultants and staff. Mechanism of 
transparency like public data bases could also be useful for surveillance or services.  
h. In Norway heads of offices and services are elected on democratic grounds or hired 
following standardized procedures. These administrative arrangements could be transfer 
as they had proved to be more efficient in avoiding corruption than the right attributed to 
political authorities to appoint their collaborators.  
i. Public Health Nurse, Mother-Child Units and the General Doctor are pro-active elements 
that not only monitoring but also connecting the population with the services. These 
agents are a feature that could be transfer from, helping to mobilize the institution from an 
attendance approach to a proactive-preventative scope.    
j. Free access of information and participation of citizens and relevant social actors in the 
design of policies are ideas that could be transfer and help to develop transparency, 
diminish corruption and build trust.  
 
Policy transfer for the development of a functional administrative organization with lower 
bureaucracy    
 
d. Clear coordination channels represented by the control agents.  
e. Avoid parallelism by transferring national programs and policies to the responsibility of 
local authorities.  
f. There is the need to highlight the matter of childhood. In Norway there are specific 
institutions and services working with children, these institutions are the first to embrace 
and transmit a vision of childhood different from that of complete dependency and an 
adult in becoming. Then a factor that can be transfer this way of working, from the 
services to the norms.  
 
Policy transfer to ensure better resources  
 
a. Transform child protection local units and health mobile units to stable offices and 
services. In this way there are subject to the control mechanisms but also avoid 
bureucratic procedures, ensuring stable resources and continuity of service.   
 
 7.5. Final thoughts 
 
Political development is a matter of two things: economic growth and social justice. Economic 
growth or higher budgetary assignation to social development will not due much in the effective 
attention of social needs. Neither will an increase on the scope of the responsibilities. This 
analysis shows that state building is essential to promote social and political development. The 
institutional and implementation analysis repeatedly pointed at three areas of challenges faced by 
the Bolivia. These challenges are associated to the unbalance existing between the three main 
institutions for political development: the state, the rule of law and the accountable government.  
This unbalance has detrimental effects on the capacity of the state to transform normative 
principles, policies and programs into practice (limitation on the implementation capacity). What 
is necessary is to parallel social investment with state building. State building not as the: 
attribution of more power to decision makers, neither the ascription of overwhelming 
responsibilities to an insufficient state, nor the lowering of the scope responsibilities. Rather, to 
equip the state with better tools to reinforce its capacity to carry on with the scope of 
responsibilities it assumes. Thus, in this research by using Norway as model for political 
development I identified the features that are key to for better effective implementation, tools for 
building state capacity. 
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Annex I 
 
 
 
 
Interview guide English  
 
Each interview will have two aims: 
 
c. Identify the policies behind the services, benefits and the institutional buddy that is 
available to provide the services and benefits in the field of child protection services, child 
benefits and care, and health services for children less than six years of age.  
 
d. Characterized and described the services, benefits, and institutional buddy available in the 
framework of child welfare coverage for children less than six years of age. 
 
Following this double aim, the first phase of each interview will be guided by open questions 
targeting the aim A. Later, a grill of possible case scenarios within each field of interest will be 
used to guide the characterization and description of the services, benefits and institutional buddy 
available. 
 Phase 1:  
 
What are the institutional and organizational conditions of the services and benefits? 
What are the legislative framework and the policies behind these services and benefits?   
 
Phase 2:  
 
Guiding questions, for each stage consider in the hypothetical case diagram the fallowing 
questions will be answer  
Coverage: What services are available? What do the services cover? How are this services? 
Provider: Who provides these services? 
Conditions of access: what are the conditions (gate-keepers) to have access to these services? - 
Who can have access to these services?  
Quality: What is the quality of these services? What are the institutional conditions to provide 
these services? Are these services effective? Why? Is the quality of the services depending on 
something? What? 
A. Topic: Health care  
 
A women suspects she 
is pregnante  
 
Yes she is 
pergnante 
 
During pregnancy  
During 
delivery  
Child 0 - 2 years of 
age  
Child 2 - 6 
Sick  Attention 
Healthy 
Prevention  
Promotion 
Mother  
Sick  Attention 
Healthy  
Prevention  
Promotion 
Child  
Sick  Attention 
Healthy  
Prevention 
Promotion 
Mother  
Child 
Sick 
Attention 
Healthy   
Prevention  
Promotion  
no she is not 
pregnante  
 B. Topic: Child Protection   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
There is Household with  
children under 6 years of 
age  
Caring-givers 
Domestic violence 
between parents  
Violencetowards the 
child 
Care-givers risk 
behaviour 
Adictions  
mental /emotional 
problems  
Poor parenting skills  
Criminal activities   
it is confirmed that exists 
in the form of...  
Household conditions  
Poverty  
Poor/inapropiate 
housing conditions 
Child  
Poor/Low school 
performance  
Behavioural Problems 
Disabilities 
Risk condutions 
suspected among... 
 Annex II 
 
 
Interview Guide Spanish  
 
Entrevista con expertos y personal  
 
Cada entrevista tiene dos objetivos: 
 
a. Identificar las políticas detrás de los servicios, beneficios y arreglos institucionales que 
está disponible para proporcionar servicios y beneficios en cada una de las tres áreas.  
 
b. Caracterizar y describir los servicios, beneficios y arreglos institucionales disponibles en 
el marco de los servicios de bienestar para niños y niñas menores de seis años. 
 
A raíz de este doble objetivo, la primera fase de cada entrevista se guiará por las preguntas 
abiertas dirigidas al objetivo A. Más tarde, una parrilla de posibles escenarios de casos 
dentro de cada campo de interés se utilizará para guiar la caracterización y descripción de 
los servicios, beneficios y arreglos institucionales disponibles. 
 
 Fase 1: 
 
¿Cuáles son las condiciones institucionales y de organización de los servicios y beneficios? 
¿Cuáles son el marco legislativo y las políticas detrás de estos servicios y beneficios? 
 
Fase 2: 
 
Guía de preguntas, para cada posible escenario del esquema hipotético de casos: 
Cobertura: ¿Qué servicios están disponibles? ¿Qué cubren los servicios? ¿Cómo son estos 
servicios? 
Proveedor: ¿Quién proporciona estos servicios? 
Condiciones de acceso: ¿cuáles son las condiciones de acceso a estos servicios? - ¿Quién 
puede tener acceso a estos servicios? 
Calidad: ¿Cuál es la calidad de estos servicios? ¿Cuáles son las condiciones institucionales 
para prestar estos servicios? ¿Son estos servicios eficaces? ¿Por qué?, de qué depende la 
calidad de estos servicios?  
 
 
 
 
A. Topico: Servicios de salud   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
una mujer sospecha 
está embarazada 
 
si esta 
embarazada 
 
durante el embarazo 
durante el 
parto 
nino o nina de  0 - 
2 anos 
nino/nina 2 - 6 
enfermo Attnción 
saludable 
Prevención 
Promoción 
servicios para la 
madre  (hasta que 
edad es la salud de la 
madre relevante? 
cuidados despues de 
parto?) 
enferma Atención 
saludable 
Prevención  
Promoción 
Hijo/ hija 
enfermo Atención 
saludable 
Prevención 
Promoción 
Madre 
Bebé  
enferma o en mal 
estado de salud 
Atención? 
saludable o en buen 
estado de salud 
Prevención? 
Promoción? 
no esta 
embarazada 
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Tópico: Servicios de protección infantile 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
hay una familia con 
ninos/ninas menores a 6 anos 
padres o sustitutos en funcion 
violencia domestica entre los 
padres o figuras paternas o 
miembros significativos de la 
familia extensa 
violencia hacia el nino o nina 
menor de 6 anos 
conductas de riesgo en los 
padres o provedores de 
cuidado 
Adicciones  
problemas mentales o 
emocionales 
habilidades de cuidado 
insificientes o riesgosas 
participacion en actividades 
criminales 
se confirma la presencia en la 
forma de... 
condiciones de familia y 
vivienda 
Poverty  
Poor/inapropiate housing 
conditions 
en relacion al nino/nina 
pobre o bajo desempenho en 
nivel pre-escolar 
problemas de salud  
capacidades especiales o 
disabilidades físicas y/o 
mentales 
conductaso situaciones de 
riesgo  sospechada en 
relacion a... 
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